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The efforts of the Bush administration in the early 2000s to establish democratic 
regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq reflect an American foreign policy tradition that began at 
the end of World War II. The pairing of national security interests with the success of 
foreign regimes (and, specifically, regimes headed by charismatic “strong men”) was a 
common feature of Cold War–era foreign policy employed by every presidential 
administration from Harry S. Truman through Ronald Reagan. The U.S. support for 
President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic of Vietnam was a notable failure within this 
tradition. America’s disillusionment with Diem, and its subsequent complicity in his 
overthrow and murder, marked the beginning of its direct military involvement in 
Vietnam. Two-and-a-half million U.S. troops would eventually serve in Vietnam in a 
failed effort to prevent the Democratic Republic of Vietnam from uniting the country 
under a communist regime. Examination of the U.S. partnership with Diem during the 
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations illuminates factors that led to its demise and 
may help to prevent their future repetition. 
This thesis argues that both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations focused 
their aid programs on military security at the expense of political and economic reform, 
thus failing to address the political inequities that ultimately led to Diem’s demise. 
American military aid, calculated to support Diem, ultimately provided the foundation for 
the military coup that overthrew him. This thesis argues that the Diem experiment shows, 
first, that military security cannot be a substitute for political stability, and second, that 
limited-liability commitments—like the one to Diem—may prove more politically 
consequential than they first appear, once they start to unravel. 
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The efforts of the Bush administration in the early 2000s to establish democratic 
regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq reflect an American foreign policy tradition that began at 
the end of World War II. The pairing of national security interests with the success of 
foreign regimes (and, specifically, regimes headed by charismatic “strong men”) was a 
common feature of Cold War–era foreign policy employed by every presidential 
administration from Harry S. Truman through Ronald Reagan. The U.S. support for 
President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) was a notable failure within 
this tradition. America’s disillusionment with Diem, and its subsequent complicity in his 
overthrow and murder, marked the beginning of its direct military involvement in 
Vietnam. Two-and-a-half million U.S. troops would eventually serve in Vietnam in a 
failed effort to prevent the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) from uniting the 
country under a communist regime. Examination of the U.S. partnership with Diem 
during the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations illuminates factors that led to its 
demise and may help to prevent their future repetition. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis researches the Cold War partnership between the United States and 
Ngo Dinh Diem of Vietnam with the aim of explaining its evolution and eventual 
collapse. Specifically, how and why did the U.S. assessment of Diem’s leadership change 
so much that U.S. policy in Vietnam shifted from wholehearted support of Diem under 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower to conspiring with South Vietnamese generals to bring 
about a coup under President John F. Kennedy? In four chapters covering a time period 
beginning with the close of World War II and ending with the November 1963 coup that 
deposed Diem, this thesis answers the following questions to develop a deeper 
understanding of the U.S.-Diem partnership: What was the strategic value of Vietnam to 
the United States, how did that value change over time, and how did that value affect the 
U.S. assessment of Diem? Did the U.S. perception of Diem change, or did Diem’s 
leadership performance change? More specifically, did Diem start the partnership with 
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the United States by complying with Western norms of democratic leadership, only later 
developing into an autocratic tyrant; or was Diem’s leadership consistent for the duration 
of his near decade in power, so that the initial U.S. assessment of Diem altered as time 
progressed? 
B. IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
The decision to align U.S. strategy in Southeast Asia with the success of the Diem 
regime was not the first or last time in the history of U.S. foreign policy that support of a 
foreign regime defined the means of achieving national interests, and the pairing of U.S. 
security interests with the success of foreign regimes remains a feature of U.S. foreign 
policy. Similar policies pursued by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq beginning 
in the early 2000s yielded two wars that have lasted for longer than a decade, resulted in 
the deaths of thousands of U.S. service members, cost the United States trillions of 
dollars, and at the time this thesis was written, have yet to facilitate the formation of 
stable, democratic governments in Kabul and Baghdad.1 The U.S. partnership with Diem 
also proved a failed policy, having commenced unilateral American involvement in 
Vietnam that plagued five presidential administrations, called for the deployment of two-
and-a-half million U.S. troops, cost the United States hundreds of billions of dollars, and 
ultimately failed to prevent the DRV from uniting the country under a communist 
regime.2 Examining the formation of U.S. policy in Vietnam after World War II, how the 
Eisenhower administration’s assessment of Diem resulted in wholehearted U.S. support 
for his regime, and how the Kennedy administration’s assessment of Diem initially led to 
continued U.S. support but ultimately led to the November 1963 coup may illuminate the 
factors that contributed to the failure of the partnership and prevent their future repetition. 
                                                 
1 Catherine Lutz, “U.S. and Coalition Casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan,” Costs of War, The Watson 
Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University, last modified 21 February 2013, 1, 
http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2013/USandCoalition.pdf; Neta C. Crawford, 
“U.S. Budgetary Costs of Wars through 2016: $4.70 Trillion and Counting,” Costs of War, The Watson 
Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University, last modified September 2016, 7, 
http://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2016/Costs%20of%20War%20through%202016
%20FINAL%20final%20v2.pdf. 
2 Stephen Dagget, Costs of Major U.S. Wars (CRS Report No. RS22926) (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 26 June 2010), 2, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22926.pdf. 
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C. HYPOTHESIS 
This thesis argues that both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations focused 
their aid programs to South Vietnam on military security at the expense of political and 
economic reform, thus failing to address the political inequities that undermined Diem’s 
regime and his credibility as a leader. American military aid, calculated to support Diem, 
ultimately provided the foundation for the military coup that overthrew him. This thesis 
also argues that the Diem experiment shows, first, that military security cannot substitute 
for political stability, and second, that limited-liability commitments—like the one to 
Diem—may prove more politically consequential than they first appear, once they start to 
unravel. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The research for this thesis was conducted as a historical analysis based primarily 
on the extensive secondary literature available on the subject, using primary sources to 
further illuminate specific arguments. The first chapter consists of a chronological 
examination of events that pertain to the formation of U.S. policy in Vietnam beginning 
with the end of World War II and continuing through the Geneva Conference of 1954. 
The subsequent three chapters examine evidence from the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
administrations pertaining to Diem’s leadership ability, the U.S. assessment of Diem’s 
leadership ability, and how those assessments informed U.S. policy formation. 
E. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The organization of this literature review reflects the chapter sequence of the 
thesis. The first chapter examines the development of U.S. foreign policy toward 
Indochina following the close of World War II through the 1954 Geneva Conference, 
establishing the context within which the Eisenhower administration made its initial 
assessment of Diem as a potential ally in the effort to contain the spread of communism 
in Southeast Asia. William J. Duiker explains that U.S. foreign policy toward Southeast 
Asia during the immediate post-war years was shaped by President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s belief that a regional power vacuum, due in part to European colonialism, 
had established the conditions for war in the Pacific. Roosevelt’s solution called for the 
 4 
end of colonialism which, in the case of Indochina, would be facilitated by a transitional 
international trusteeship. This policy also supported U.S. interests by establishing 
independent international markets that would support American capitalism.3 David L. 
Anderson and Gary R. Hess concur, explaining that Roosevelt’s initial plan for Indochina 
was decolonization enabled by a temporary international trusteeship.4 
With Roosevelt’s death and the post-war collapse of cooperation with the Soviet 
Union, U.S. alarm at apparent Soviet expansionism—above all in Europe—took 
precedence over U.S. decolonization policy. George C. Herring asserts Eastern Europe 
was the immediate battlefront of U.S. efforts to contain communism, deprioritizing policy 
concerns in Southeast Asia. He argues that the Truman administration valued French 
support in Eastern Europe against the Soviets significantly more than the guarantee of 
self-determination in Indochina, instigating a policy shift toward a U.S. commitment not 
to obstruct the restoration of French colonial interests. U.S. policy continued to evolve 
during the late 1940s as U.S. officials determined that nationalist sentiment in Indochina 
was aligned with Ho Chi Minh, indicating that Indochinese self-determination would 
likely result in the spread of communism to Southeast Asia. This was anathema to the 
Truman administration and prompted U.S. policy to shift in support of French 
colonialism.5 George McTurnan Kahin agrees, contending that concern with sustaining 
France as an anti-Soviet ally in Europe dominated U.S. policy in Vietnam.6 Duiker offers 
that U.S. officials may have believed they were continuing Roosevelt’s Southeast Asian 
policy, modified for prevailing circumstances. Whether or not U.S. foreign policy 
reflected the late president’s intentions, U.S. policy in Indochina became dominated by 
                                                 
3 William J. Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy and the Conflict in Indochina (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1994), Kindle edition, 31–32. 
4 David L. Anderson, The Vietnam War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 16; Gary R. Hess, 
The United States’ Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power, 1940–1950 (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1987), 81–82. 
5 George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975, 4th ed. 
(New York: McGraw Hill, 2002), 10–14. 
6 George McT. Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1986), 3–6. 
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national security concerns in Europe and the requirement of French support to address 
those concerns.7 
The Eisenhower administration reaffirmed the containment of communism as the 
principal U.S. foreign policy concern while increasing the relative strategic priority of 
Southeast Asia. John Lewis Gaddis explains that the belief that the Soviet Union would 
pursue an aggressive foreign policy was central to Eisenhower’s New Look policy, the 
administration’s national security strategy. While nuclear deterrence was the outstanding 
feature of the New Look, it also called for reliance on allies to contain communism in 
foreign regions, translating into U.S. support of the French in their war against the 
Vietminh.8 Anderson shows that Eisenhower illustrated the specific importance of 
Indochina with the Domino Theory, explaining that the fall of Indochina would signal the 
first stage of the rapid spread of communism throughout Southeast Asia.9 It is within this 
context that the United States approached the Geneva Conference in 1954. 
The first chapter concludes by discussing the conduct of the U.S. delegation at the 
Geneva Conference, the point at which the Eisenhower administration reshaped its 
Indochina policy and created the framework within which it would pursue a partnership 
with Diem. The literature is fairly uniform in describing how security interests shaped 
U.S. conduct during and after the Geneva Conference. Frederik Logevall, Robert D. 
Schulzinger, and Herring all explain that the United States was apprehensive that the 
conference would facilitate a compromise between the French and Vietminh tantamount 
to communist victory, a likelihood increased by the disaster at Dienbienphu. Logevall 
further contends that the administration’s fear of appearing to be communist appeasers 
restricted the United States from formally participating due to the presence of the Chinese 
                                                 
7 Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 47–51. 
8 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security 
Policy During the Cold War, Revised and Expanded ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 127–
38. 
9 David L. Anderson, Trapped by Success: The Eisenhower Administration and Vietnam, 1953–61 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1991), 17. 
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delegation.10 Anderson asserts that while simultaneously pursuing allied military support 
for the French throughout the conference, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles coopted 
the British and French delegations to negotiate for a set of principles that would facilitate 
U.S. strategy initiatives following the conference. The Soviet and Chinese delegations 
also impacted the conference’s outcome, pressuring the Vietminh to accept compromise 
that fell short of Vietnamese expectations and showing the Vietminh that partnership with 
the Soviet Union or China would coincide with the displacement of their desires by big 
power politics. The accords of the 1954 Geneva Conference enabled the United States to 
unilaterally pursue nation-building in South Vietnam to prevent the dominos from falling 
in Southeast Asia.11 
The second chapter examines the relationship between the United States and 
Diem from the end of the Geneva Conference through the intensification of anti-Diem 
resistance in late 1959, a period that begins with the United States’ decision to 
wholeheartedly support Diem in the spring of 1955. Anderson describes the early U.S. 
assessment of Diem as contentious, with policymaker opinions of Diem’s leadership 
ability ranging widely from severe reservation to enthusiastic endorsement. The argument 
centered on Diem’s ability to unite and lead the fractious political environment of Saigon 
following the Geneva Conference. Diem ultimately secured unilateral U.S. support after 
successfully routing Binh Xuyen forces in the April 1955 Battle of Saigon, demonstrating 
sufficient leadership ability around which, according to the Eisenhower administration, 
U.S. aid and advice could facilitate the building of a non-communist nation.12 Edward 
Miller and Seth Jacobs offer similar arguments, asserting that Diem’s success during the 
Battle of Saigon exhibited sufficient evidence to Eisenhower and Dulles of Diem’s ability 
                                                 
10 Herring, America’s Longest War, 46; Fredrik Logevall, Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and 
the Making of America’s Vietnam (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2013), 554–59; Robert 
D. Schulzinger, A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941–1975 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 71–77. 
11 Anderson, Trapped by Success, 41–45. 
12 Ibid., 109–13. 
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to consolidate power, warranting continued support to achieve U.S. strategic objectives in 
the region.13 
Duiker explains that, following the decision to back Diem, the Eisenhower 
administration supported the regime with the hopes of facilitating the development of a 
self-sustaining, noncommunist outpost in Southeast Asia, in the meantime achieving at 
least the temporary prevention of communism’s spread throughout the region while other 
Southeast Asian allied governments strengthened.14 Anderson concurs, and further 
explains that as U.S. policymakers directed aid and advice to the government of what had 
become the RVN, Diem ignored the urgings of his U.S. patrons and pursued an 
autocratic, personalist governance policy to consolidate his power and effect political 
stability. Diem’s conduct created two opposing camps among U.S. policymakers, the first 
represented primarily by State Department officials who believed Diem’s autocratic 
leadership conflicted with U.S. strategic objectives, and the second camp represented by 
Defense Department officials who believed Diem’s leadership was a secondary concern 
to the demand for military security in the young country that, once achieved, would 
enable the development of a noncommunist government regardless of the specific local 
leadership. The Eisenhower administration focused on military aid that aligned with the 
Defense Department’s perspective, containing communism in Vietnam while focusing on 
more pressing strategic concerns both within the region and globally.15 
The third chapter covers the period from 1959 through early 1963, examining the 
development of anti-Diem resistance in Vietnam, Diem’s response to that resistance, and 
the evolution of the Kennedy administration’s Vietnam policy. Ellen J. Hammer and 
David Kaiser argue that Diem’s harsh and autocratic response to the communist 
insurgency and other noncommunist opponents diminished his ability to unify Vietnam 
                                                 
13 Edward Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013); Seth Jacobs, America’s Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh 
Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia, 1950–1957 (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2004), 210–16; Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America’s War in Vietnam, 
1950–1963 (New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006), 77–80. 
14 Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 243–48. 
15 Anderson, Trapped by Success, 170–73; Vietnam War, 30–36; Herring, America’s Longest War, 
68–80. 
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and created the conditions that precipitated his demise.16 During the same period, the 
Kennedy administration took office, representing an approach to foreign policy termed 
“Flexible Response” that maintained containment of communism as the chief U.S. 
strategic interest. A pillar of Kennedy’s approach was maintaining U.S. commitments to 
foreign allies to prevent a crisis of confidence in the international system, a requirement 
that became amplified in Vietnam due to unfavorable events concerning communism 
globally, specifically in Laos, Cuba, and Berlin.17 During this period, Diem’s policies for 
countering resistance from communist insurgents and competing nationalist proved 
ineffective, and the Kennedy administration began to reevaluate Diem’s contribution to 
the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives in Vietnam.18 
The final chapter discusses the events and decisions in 1963 leading to the 
November 1963 coup that deposed Diem. Anderson shows that the battle of Ap Bac and 
the Buddhist Crisis represented the outcomes of Diem’s failed policies, prompting 
Kennedy administration officials to conclude that the Vietnamese president was no 
longer the indispensable keystone of U.S. anticommunism strategy in Vietnam.19 Miller 
further explains the failed U.S.-Vietnamese counterinsurgency strategy combined with 
Diem’s persistent intransigence toward U.S. advice created the context within which U.S. 
policymakers simultaneously delivered ultimatums to the Diem regime while signaling to 
opposition groups within Saigon—specifically Army of the Republic of Vietnam 
(ARVN) generals—that the United States would not interfere with coup attempts.20 
Duiker offers a similar argument, asserting that by 1963, Diem had proven unable to 
generate the political support in Vietnam required to resist a communist takeover in the 
South.21 Hammer shows that Diem’s actions had also lost him the support of the 
                                                 
16 David Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War 
(Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000); Ellen J. Hammer, A Death in 
November: America in Vietnam, 1963 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 70–77. 
17 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 230–40. 
18 Anderson, Vietnam War, 36–40. 
19 Ibid., 38–40. 
20 Miller, Misalliance, 279–318. 
21 Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 303–8. 
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American public, making it impossible for U.S. policymakers to maintain the status quo 
in Vietnam.22 By 1963, it was clear military aid to the Diem regime was failing to 
achieve the strategic objective of developing an independent, noncommunist South 
Vietnam as a garrison of anticommunism in Southeast Asia, compelling the Kennedy 
administration to conclude that an effective policy required Diem’s removal. 
  
                                                 
22 Hammer, Death in November, 169–219. 
 10 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 11 
II. THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM, 1945–1954 
This chapter examines the evolution of U.S. foreign policy concerning Indochina 
beginning with President Franklin Delano Roosevelt at the end of World War II through 
the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower and the end of the First Indochina 
War at the Geneva Conference of 1954, ultimately resulting in U.S. support of Premier 
Ngo Dinh Diem. Roosevelt’s initial policy called for Indochina to be placed under the 
control of an international trusteeship following World War II, which he meant to 
facilitate a transition to Indochinese self-determination. Resistance from the French and 
British, combined with dissent within his own administration, led Roosevelt to soften his 
position and provide the path for France’s return to Indochina without opposition from 
the United States. President Harry S. Truman continued Roosevelt’s policy of 
noninterference, but the rise of the Cold War and the perceived advance of the 
communist threat compelled the administration to commence a U.S. military and 
economic aid program supporting the French and the South Vietnamese in their war 
against the Vietminh. Finally, the Eisenhower administration’s Indochina policy through 
early 1954 consisted of attempts to bolster French resolve to prevent a communist victory 
in Indochina. When that policy failed and the French and Vietminh approached a 
compromise in Geneva, the Eisenhower administration prepared to unilaterally support 
the South Vietnamese government of Bao Dai led by Diem, thereby preventing Hanoi 
from unifying the country under communist rule. 
A. ROOSEVELT AND INTERNATIONAL TRUSTEESHIP 
The Roosevelt administration’s initial evaluation of Indochina’s relevance to U.S. 
strategic interests reflected economic concerns involving the wider region of Southeast 
Asia. During the 1930s, trade development between the United States and Southeast Asia 
yielded the region as the primary provider of tin and crude rubber for U.S. industry, 
materials the Roosevelt administration recognized as critical to the Allied war effort. The 
U.S. freezing of Japanese assets in response to their invasion of Indochina in the summer 
of 1941 illustrates the administration’s strategic valuation of the area, showing that the 
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preservation of access to crucial industrial materials justified the escalation of conflict 
with Japan.23 Over the course of World War II, improvements in industrial technology 
gradually reduced the demand for Southeast Asian tin and rubber, previously among the 
most valuable commodities produced in Asia. The decreased demand reduced the 
strategic value of Southeast Asia in the Allied war effort, a diminution apparent in the 
interwar shift of Allied strategy in the Pacific from expelling the Japanese from the 
Southeast Asian mainland to the island-hoping campaign targeting the Japanese 
homeland. Though the Southeast Asian mainland was no longer among the primary 
focuses of U.S. war planners, Roosevelt retained a policy for the region following Allied 
victory that he believed would help to prevent a third world war.24 The president believed 
that the instability caused by failed colonial systems during the pre-war period had been 
an important factor leading to the outbreak of conflict. Therefore, following the war, 
Roosevelt planned to place former colonial holdings under international trusteeship that 
would facilitate a transition to self-determination, removing a major source of 
international instability.25 
As World War II came to a close, Roosevelt’s policy began to shift. The British 
and French, both intent on reasserting colonial control in their former territories, 
vehemently opposed Roosevelt’s proposed international trusteeships. Roosevelt’s plan 
was also contested within his administration. The State Department’s Office of European 
Affairs argued that insisting on an international trusteeship for Indochina would threaten 
post-war cooperation between the United States and France, while the Office of Far 
Eastern Affairs agreed with the president, countering that the United States should 
support nationalist movements in the colonial world. The agreements reached at the Yalta 
Conference in February 1945 stated that colonial holdings would only be placed under 
international trusteeship with voluntarily acquiescence by the colonial power, reflecting a 
softening of Roosevelt’s position in favor of the State Department’s Europeanists.26 
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B. TRUMAN AND CONTAINMENT POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 
When President Truman took the oath of office following Roosevelt’s death in 
April 1945, U.S. policy concerning Indochina remained fervently debated within the 
State Department. This debate occurred against the backdrop of Allied cooperation 
deteriorating into a competition for international influence between the Soviet Union and 
the Western Allies led by the United States, ultimately resulting in the development of 
U.S. containment policy aimed at halting the global spread of communism.27 Through 
1946, however, the administration viewed mainland Southeast Asia as peripheral to the 
main battleground of containment policy in Western Europe, a policy articulated in 
George Kennan’s influential “long telegram.”28 The priority of U.S. policy concerns in 
Western Europe underscored the position of the State Department’s Office of European 
Affairs, which continued to argue that the United States should not interfere with French 
efforts to reestablish colonial rule in Indochina, so as to avoid compromising French 
cooperation in Western Europe. The Office of Far Eastern Affairs maintained their 
opposing argument, but now asserted that the French repeatedly exhibited a failure to 
institute reforms leading to Indochinese self-determination and that continued support of 
the French would undermine the Asian perception of the United States, leaving a regional 
leadership void that could be filled by communism.29 Through the end of the 1946, the 
U.S. policy toward Indochina reflected a compromise of these diverging arguments. The 
Truman administration chose not to oppose the French return to Indochina while 
simultaneously attempting, through multiple diplomatic communications, to encourage 
the French government to pursue a dialogue with the newly established Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and provide a path to self-determination for the 
Vietnamese.30 
By the time war broke out between the French and the Vietminh at the end of 
1946, U.S. policy had shifted to reflect Indochina’s increasing role in the global 
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containment of communism. General George C. Marshall, having recently accepted the 
appointment to Secretary of State, forwarded a letter to the U.S. embassy in Paris in 
February 1947 that concisely summarized the dilemma that characterized the United 
States’ Indochina policy. While articulating that U.S. policy of noninterference in French 
objectives in Indochina remained unchanged, Marshall expressed frustration with the 
French policymakers’ failure to abandon its “dangerous, outmoded colonial outlook” in 
Indochina and provide for a meaningful form of Vietnamese self-determination.31 
Marshall also conceded, however, that Ho Chi Minh’s ties to Moscow as a devoted 
communist compromised his nationalist credentials, and that an independent Vietnamese 
government under Ho would represent a Soviet victory. The secretary of state admittedly 
offered no solution beyond encouraging French flexibility in continued negotiations with 
the Vietminh. The United States still saw the optimal solution to the Indochina problem 
as the creation of an independent, noncommunist state within the French Union, but U.S. 
policy offered no path to this solution other than continued encouragement of the French 
to achieve it.32 
While the U.S. policy concerning Indochina remained conflicted, the French 
pursued an alternative political solution to compromise with the DRV. The French 
conducted negotiations concerning a future Vietnamese state with Bao Dai, the former 
emperor who abdicated his throne in August 1945, transferring sovereignty to Ho Chi 
Minh’s DRV. Living among other absentee Vietnamese nationalists in Hong Kong, Bao 
Dai represented an ideal alternative to the DRV for the French. These negotiations 
resulted in the March 1949 signing of the Elysée Accords, a treaty that provided for the 
eventual inclusion of an independent Vietnamese state—led by Bao Dai—within the 
French Union.33 U.S. policymakers had serious doubts that the Elysée Accords would 
lead to the strong, independent, noncommunist state for which they hoped. The treaty 
contained few specific details concerning the means or timeline of establishing the 
proposed Vietnamese state. Furthermore, it appeared the Bao Dai regime was destined to 
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become little more than a French puppet government, as Bao Dai and his compatriots in 
Hong Kong had no apparent nationalist support within Vietnam.34 Dean Acheson, 
Marshall’s successor as secretary of state, articulated the U.S. response to the Elysée 
Accords in a May 1949 message to U.S. diplomats in Saigon. Acheson echoed Marshall’s 
earlier assertion that any Vietnamese government that included the Vietminh would 
ultimately lead to a communist victory, and therefore the U.S. policy of supporting 
French efforts in Indochina while pressuring them to provide for Vietnamese self-
determination should be continued. In the Bao Dai government, however, Acheson 
perceived similarities with the failed Chiang Kai-shek regime, and he stated that the 
Truman administration could not support a government incapable of capturing nationalist 
support and destined to fail.35 The United States would “wait and see” if the Bao Dai 
government exhibited the qualities of an effective government that would warrant U.S. 
recognition and support.36 
Events external to Southeast Asia led the Truman administration to solidify an 
official U.S. policy concerning Indochina. Senator Joseph McCarthy’s “red scare” had 
made hardline anticommunism a powerful force in Washington.37 This coincided with 
the communist victory over Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist regime in China.38 Finally, 
many within the Truman administration believed that Bao Dai’s government, absent 
French support, would fall to the Vietminh.39 These developments led to Truman’s April 
1950 approval of the report to the National Security Council (NSC)-64, which stated that 
the United States would prevent the spread of communism in Indochina, thereby 
preventing its spread throughout the entire Southeast Asian region.40 Within one month, 
Truman authorized the commencement of U.S. support for the Bao Dai regime through 
the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, a platform of economic and military assistance 
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facilitated by the French colonial government. Following the North Korean invasion of 
South Korea in June 1950, the Truman administration reiterated its evaluation of 
Indochina as a frontline in the containment of communism and increased the U.S. 
military aid program.41 Fearing that Bao Dai’s government would fall to the Vietminh 
without French support, Truman continued to furnish military and economic support of 
the French and South Vietnamese through the remainder of his term in office, passing to 
Eisenhower a U.S. commitment to forcibly resist the spread of communism in Indochina. 
C. EISENHOWER’S NEW LOOK AND THE DOMINO THEORY 
As an ardent Cold Warrior, Eisenhower took the oath of office in January 1953 
committed to the continuation of containment policy started by the Truman 
administration. The president and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, believed that 
driven by the insecurity of coexistence with free nations, the Soviet Union would 
continue to exhibit an aggressive posture aimed at communism’s global expansion.42 
Eisenhower articulated this idea in a November 1953 news conference: “Let me say 
something: anyone who doesn’t recognize that the great struggle of our time is an 
ideological one, that is, a system of regimentation and of virtual-slavery as against the 
concept of freedom on which our government is founded, then they are not looking this 
question squarely in the face.”43 The U.S. focus on the global communist threat in a zero-
sum international system would persist under the Eisenhower administration. 
Eisenhower conceived a different approach to containment policy, however, and 
one of his departures from the Truman administration’s foreign policy concerned the 
costs associated with the means of containing communism, which he wished to contain, 
to the extent possible. Eisenhower ran for president on a platform that included reducing 
the defense budget, and his administration was always on the look-out for cost-effective 
sources of strategic leverage (of which nuclear weapons became the prime example). He 
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also considered economic strength and military strength as interdependent concepts, 
implying imbalance in either direction as precursor to the loss of both. Within this 
framework, Eisenhower believed the immense defense spending associated with the 
Truman Doctrine threatened to displace U.S. economic stability and progress, 
simultaneously eliminating the basis of superior U.S. military strength and the foundation 
of the American way of life. Furthermore, he believed that conflict with the Soviet Union 
would be a protracted endeavor.44 
Eisenhower’s perception of the Soviet threat also informed his opinions regarding 
economic strength. He articulated this point in a radio address on May 19, 1953: “It has 
been coldly calculated by the Soviet leaders, for by their military threat they have hoped 
to force upon America and the free world an unbearable security burden leading to 
economic disaster. They have plainly said that free people cannot preserve their way of 
life and at the same time provide enormous military establishments.”45 Eisenhower’s 
national security strategy demanded achievement of Truman’s ends with significantly 
less costly means. 
In the summer of 1953, Eisenhower initiated Operation Solarium at the National 
War College, charging its participants with incorporating the administration’s initiatives 
into national security policy recommendations. The product of Operation Solarium 
formed the basis of NSC-162/2 and would become known as Eisenhower’s New Look 
policy. The report offered methods of pursuing containment aimed at “regaining the 
initiative” in the Cold War while simultaneously reducing investment of national treasure 
in the same endeavor.46 Specifically, the document outlined the basic aim of U.S. 
national security policy as meeting “the Soviet threat to U.S. policy” while not “seriously 
weakening the U.S. economy or undermining [American] fundamental values and 
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institutions.”47 One method, and perhaps the most infamous prescription of the New 
Look due to the rhetoric dispensed by Dulles, was deterrence based on the threatened 
employment of nuclear weapons. Additional recommendations included an emphasis on 
the deterring power of alliances, calling for their continued fiscal support and reliance on 
allied ground forces in local engagements; overt propaganda campaigns designed to 
discredit individual Soviet leaders, the various communist parties, and the communist 
ideology; covert operations targeting the Soviet Union, the Sino-Soviet relationship, and 
governments throughout the Soviet bloc; and a diplomatic stance receptive to 
negotiations with the Soviet Union (though expectations Soviet leadership would 
approach the United States were extremely low).48 
Southeast Asia provided the most immediate test of the administration’s New 
Look policy. At a news conference on April 7, 1954, Eisenhower articulated the strategic 
significance of Indochina using the now-famous domino analogy while also intimating 
how containment would be pursued within the framework of the New Look policy. 
Discussing the likely impact of the loss of Indochina to communism, he explained that 
the free world would no longer have access to the valuable resources of the region and 
that millions of people would be claimed by “the Communist dictatorship,” emphasizing 
the administration’s belief that communist countries comprised a centrally controlled 
empire of the Soviet Union.49 Eisenhower proceeded to explain the implication of 
communism’s victory in Indochina with the “falling domino principle,” asserting it would 
be the “beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences.”50 
To Eisenhower, the fall of Indochina meant the eventual submission of free regimes 
throughout Southeast Asia, advancing the communist threat further into East Asia and as 
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far south as Australia and New Zealand. This description of Indochina’s importance 
reiterated the administration’s perception of the region as integral to the worldwide battle 
against communism, which he had advanced in his first State of the Union Address.51 
Answering further questions, Eisenhower alluded to the nature of the administration’s 
intended strategy within the framework of the New Look policy. He referred to the 
Indochina conflict as “the kind of thing that must not be handled by one nation trying to 
act alone,” requiring a “concert of opinion” and a unified commitment to an allied 
response.52 
D. THE NEW LOOK IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE GENEVA 
CONFERENCE 
The New Look initially took form in Indochina as the continuation of U.S. aid to 
the French in support of their war with the Vietminh. The administration told the French 
that further aid was conditional on the development of a more aggressive strategy, and 
Eisenhower sent the U.S. embassy in France a list of his ideal French candidates for 
command in Indochina. Though the president decided to take a tougher stance with the 
French, Paris still retained bargaining power. The administration understood that French 
cooperation was crucial to the ongoing U.S. attempt to form a European Defense 
Community as a counter to the Soviet threat on the continent. The new French 
commander assigned to Indochina in May 1953—General Henri Navarre—was not 
among Eisenhower’s desired choices, but his selection nevertheless communicated a shift 
to the more offensive outlook desired by the Americans. The Navarre Plan called for 
immediate small-scale missions against guerrilla forces and, following the rainy season, 
conventional operations to counter the Vietminh.53 Admiral Arthur W. Radford and the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) endorsed the plan as viable, though they asserted its success 
was conditional upon French ability and motivation to carry it through. The Joint Chiefs’ 
timidity was based on reports from the Military Assistance Advisory Group commander 
in Indochina, General John W. O’Daniel. Though ultimately recommending to proceed 
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with the plan, the Chiefs communicated reservations inspired by French inaction. In an 
August 1953 memorandum to Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson, the JCS reported that 
there were “no plans for a general fall offensive beyond limited objective operations to 
keep the enemy off balance” and that efforts to implement Navarre’s strategy had not 
proceeded “beyond the planning stages.”54 The United States received similar warnings 
concerning the Navarre Plan through diplomatic channels. In a July 1953 meeting at the 
U.S. embassy in Paris, Minister of National Defense Rene Pleven stated the domestic 
pressure for French extraction from the war in Indochina made Navarre’s plan “out of the 
question” and that “it would be difficult to maintain existing effort.”55 Prime Minister 
Joseph Laniel offered a similarly bleak assessment, stating that “Navarre was optimistic, 
but he wanted resources which could not be given [to] him.”56 
At the beginning of 1954, the administration began a reassessment of its strategic 
approach in Southeast Asia. France’s faltering motivation inspired Eisenhower to 
establish a multidepartment committee charged with forming a new plan for Indochina 
aimed at stimulating French efforts. The committee recommendations called for 
increased aid to the French, formation of a multinational defense organization to promote 
the security of noncommunist states in Southeast Asia, and, if needed, consideration of 
direct U.S. military involvement, all of which coincided with the New Look policy.57 
Around the same time, Dulles attended a conference in Berlin with French, British, and 
Soviet representatives to discuss, among other concerns, the conflict in Indochina. 
Domestic political pressures forced the French to pursue the possibility of negotiated 
settlement with the Vietminh, an outcome contrary to U.S. strategic interests but one that 
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Dulles nevertheless felt constrained from overtly opposing.58 In a February 1954 
telegram to Eisenhower, Dulles reported the delegation was working to prevent a 
conference on Indochina, but warned that his effort “carries moral obligation to continue 
to sustain military effort,” meaning that a successful blocking effort followed by failure 
to continue aid would create a French political backlash capable of undermining U.S. 
strategic initiatives in both Europe and Southeast Asia.59 Eventually, the meeting in 
Berlin produced the decision to pursue a negotiated settlement in Geneva. 
The development that finally forced a U.S. strategic reevaluation was the siege 
and ultimate capitulation at Dienbienphu. In November 1953, Navarre directed the 
capture of a Vietminh outpost there to disrupt communist supply lines into Laos and 
fortify the defense of the royal capital, Luang Prabang. The outpost became the target of 
a massive Vietminh offensive aimed at bolstering the communist bargaining position in 
Geneva and breaking French resolve. General Paul Ely’s March 1954 visit to Washington 
illustrated the urgency triggered by Dienbienphu, prompting urgent discussion within the 
administration regarding U.S. courses of action.60 The perception of pending tragedy was 
illustrated in a telephone conversation between Dulles and Radford, both men conceding 
that “we must have a policy of our own even if France falls down. We could lose Europe, 
Asia, and Africa all at once if we don’t watch out.”61 The discussions yielded 
Eisenhower’s required preconditions for the commitment of U.S. forces to Indochina that 
guided American efforts leading to the Geneva Conference. The commitment of U.S. 
troops was contingent upon continued French involvement, unified action including 
Asian allies, and guaranteed independence of the associated states of Indochina to negate 
                                                 
58 Anderson, Trapped by Success, 24–25. 
59 John Foster Dulles, “Telegram from the Secretary of State to the President,” in Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1952–1954: Indochina 13, no. 1, ed. John P. Glennon and Neal H. Petersen (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 1982), 1025, 
http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS195254v13p1. 
60 Anderson, Trapped by Success, 26; Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 145; Schulzinger, Time for 
War, 71. 
61 Phyllis D. Bernau, “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between the Secretary of State and 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954: 
Indochina 13, no. 1, ed. John P. Glennon and Neal H. Petersen (Washington, DC: Government Printing 
Office, 1982), 1151, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS195254v13p1. 
 22 
charges of colonialism. These conditions would not be met prior to the Geneva 
Conference, given British and French reluctance to disrupt the cooperation leading to 
Geneva and French refusal to completely negate its influence in Vietnam, Laos, and 
Cambodia.62 
The U.S. delegation arrived in Geneva apprehensive the conference would 
facilitate a compromise between the French and Vietminh tantamount to communist 
victory, a likelihood increased by the disaster at Dienbienphu.63 Fearful of being a party 
to compromise with communists, Dulles sent specific codes of conduct to the U.S. 
delegation. These restricted the delegation’s role to that of representatives of an 
“interested nation” assisting the conference to arrive at an agreement respecting the 
sovereignty of the region’s free nations—specifically preventing their incorporation “into 
the Communist bloc of imperialistic dictatorship”—and charging the delegation to 
recommend U.S. withdrawal if the pending agreements conflicted with this policy.64 The 
United States continued to pursue a unified military response, and the Laniel government 
revisited the possibility during negotiations, but French unwillingness to satisfy 
Eisenhower’s preconditions for U.S. involvement and their introduction of additional 
terms unacceptable to the United States revealed Laniel’s approach as a ploy to sway 
negotiations in France’s favor. 
The accession of the Mendez-France government further diminished the 
likelihood of military action. Dulles sought to promote a new policy of U.S.-led regional 
defense by coopting British and French support for a set of principles that would facilitate 
U.S. strategy initiatives following the conference. The Soviet and Chinese delegations 
also impacted the conference’s outcome, pressuring the Vietminh to accept compromise 
below expectations to enable Soviet Union maneuvering to avoid the proposed European 
Defense Community and to allow Chinese focus on pressing domestic concerns. The 
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administration ultimately refused to endorse the Geneva accords, while recognizing that 
the agreements represented an opportunity to limit the damage done by communist 
success.65 In a July 1954 press release, Dulles asserted the task was to keep the 
communist victory north of the 17th parallel in Vietnam from spreading throughout the 
region.66 Dulles had expanded on this point in a meeting of the National Security Council 
the previous day, suggesting the funding previously directed to France should be used to 
bolster the free states of Southeast Asia to hold the “dike against communism.” 
Eisenhower agreed, directing members of the council who did not share this opinion to 
“stay away from Capitol Hill.”67 The conditions were set for direct U.S. support of the 
government of South Vietnam. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Examination of U.S. Indochina policy spanning the Roosevelt, Truman, and 
Eisenhower administrations up to the 1954 Geneva Conference demonstrates that global 
security concerns drove U.S. policy decisions. This is not to imply that U.S. policymakers 
were ignorant of circumstances in Indochina. Many members of each administration, 
including the presidents themselves, offered observations on Indochina that—in 
hindsight—reveal insightful assessments of Indochina’s domestic political environment. 
The impact of U.S. Indochina policy on the global security environment, however, 
consistently superseded those concerns. 
For the Roosevelt administration, the global security concern was their conviction 
that the pre-war colonial system had significantly contributed to the international 
instability that lead to World War II. Their initial post-war policy reflected this concern, 
calling for international trusteeships to oversee the transition of former colonial holdings 
into independent, self-determined nations. Strong British and French resistance to this 
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plan forced the administration to comparatively evaluate Allied cooperation in the post-
war reconstruction of the Western European security environment and their anticolonial 
policy. The agreements at Yalta show that the Roosevelt administration valued Allied 
cooperation higher than the elimination of colonialism, and the United States did not 
obstruct France’s return to Indochina. 
The Truman administration, faced the rise of the Cold War, reevaluated U.S. 
Indochina policy. Initially, this led to continued U.S. pressure on the French to provide 
the Vietnamese a path to self-determination as a means of establishing an independent 
state capable of resisting the spread of communism. As the rise of hardline 
anticommunism in Washington coincided with the communist victory in China and the 
North Korean invasion of South Korea, Ho Chi Minh’s communist credentials made 
compromise with the DRV and the Vietminh impossible. Though the majority opinion in 
Washington was that Bao Dai had little chance of capturing the nationalist support 
enjoyed by Ho Chi Minh, and that his government would not survive absent French 
support, the administration accepted that U.S. aid to the French and South Vietnamese to 
support their war against the Vietminh as the only viable policy option. 
The Eisenhower administration concurred with Truman’s assessment that 
preventing a communist victory was a paramount U.S. global security concern. During 
the early years of Eisenhower’s term, this translated into the continuation of Truman’s 
policy of providing military and economic aid to the French and Vietnamese. As the 
French lost the will to continue the war and approached compromise with the Vietminh at 
Geneva in 1954, U.S. policymakers prepared to institute an aid program directly to the 
South Vietnamese government. This meant establishing a bilateral relationship with Bao 
Dai’s newly appointed prime minister, Premier Ngo Dinh Diem. 
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III. WHOLEHEARTED SUPPORT OF NGO DINH DIEM 
At a U.S. State Dinner welcoming President Ngo Dinh Diem of the Republic of 
Vietnam (RVN), Eisenhower hailed the Vietnamese leader as “an inspirational leader in 
his own country” who “by his courage, his fortitude, and his statesmanship…has become 
an example for people everywhere who hate tyranny and love freedom.”68 The 
wholehearted U.S. support of Diem expressed in this toast was anything but certain in 
1954, and the U.S. partnership with Diem through the 1950s was fraught with doubt over 
his ability to build a strong, anticommunist nation south of the 17th parallel. This chapter 
discusses the development of U.S. policy concerning Vietnam and the U.S.-Diem 
partnership following the Geneva Conference of 1954 through the end of 1958. The first 
section examines how the Eisenhower administration decided to move for Diem’s 
replacement in the spring of 1955, a policy that was abandoned after Diem successfully 
defeated Binh Xuyen forces in Saigon, exhibiting the strong leadership Washington 
believed was required to prevent the spread of communism through the region. The 
second section examines how the U.S.-Diem partnership approached the national 
reunification election, the Bao Dai referendum, and the creation of the RVN to illustrate 
the nature of the partnership and how the Eisenhower administration evaluated Diem’s 
leadership. The final section evaluates the U.S. and Diem approaches to nation-building 
to show that, despite the increasing doubt among U.S. officials concerning Diem’s style 
of governance, the Eisenhower administration determined that he possessed the requisite 
leadership ability to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. 
A. THE UNITED STATES AND NGO DINH DIEM, 1954–1955 
During the Geneva Conference, the political environment in Saigon began a 
momentous shift with the installation of Ngo Dinh Diem as prime minister. Just prior to 
taking the oath of office, Diem had returned to Vietnam after three years spent abroad in 
Japan and the United States. During this time, he met future ardent Diem-supporters 
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Senator Mike Mansfield, Senator John F. Kennedy, and Professor Wesley Fishel. While 
he was overseas, the Ngo brothers worked to develop a domestic political environment in 
Vietnam favorable to Diem’s return. Ngo Dinh Luyen, a former classmate of Bao Dai, 
pursued Diem’s initiatives in Europe and eventually served as his principle correspondent 
with the absentee emperor. Ngo Dinh Can nurtured political support in Vietnam’s central 
regions, the junior ranks of the Vietnamese National Army officer corps, and the Saigon 
bureaucracy. Ngo Dinh Nhu engaged in numerous political ventures, chief among which 
was the formation of the Can Lao political party to build unified nationalist support for 
Diem.69 
The Ngo brothers exploited popular frustration with Bao Dai’s stalled efforts to 
achieve independence and pushed for a Unity Congress in September 1953. Though Nhu 
maneuvered to disassociate the Ngo brothers from its outcomes to prevent alienation 
from Bao Dai, the congress produced severe criticism of the monarch. Intending to create 
an opportunity to reassert his domestic support, Bao Dai called a National Congress in 
October 1953 that had the opposite effect, solidifying an expression of national 
dissatisfaction with the emperor’s independence program and identifying Diem as a 
favorable candidate for the premiership. The Ngo brothers’ efforts paid off in May 1953 
when Bao Dai asked Diem to take the position. The role of the United States in his 
selection appears limited to Bao Dai’s assumption that Diem would be able to deliver 
American aid, a requirement the emperor believed imminent following the French defeat 
at Dienbienphu.70 
Following the Geneva Conference, which marked the French abandonment of its 
colonial position in Southeast Asia, U.S. policy in the region shifted toward building a 
stable, noncommunist state in Vietnam south of the 17th parallel. U.S. officials also 
began evaluating whether the leadership of Ngo Dinh Diem coincided with this objective. 
Initial perceptions of Diem and the likelihood he could lead his countrymen to the 
creation of a strong state were divided among U.S. planners, and also between French 
and American diplomats. Put off by Diem’s strong anti-colonialist stance, the French 
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purportedly undertook efforts to undermine his government as soon as he took office. 
Some U.S. operatives in the region, like Colonel Edward G. Lansdale and Fishel, 
believed Diem the appropriate facilitator of U.S. interests in Vietnam. Others were less 
convinced, perhaps most significantly Ambassador Donald R. Heath.71 
The Diem debate centered on Diem’s ability to create a unified and effective 
government in the fractious political environment of South Vietnam. Diem’s main rivals 
for power and influence in Saigon were the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao religious groups, the 
Binh Xuyen criminal syndicate that had purchased control of the municipal police force 
from Bao Dai, and the Vietnamese National Army officer corps led by General Nguyen 
Van Hinh.72 Just a month after Diem took office, Heath warned the premier that “his 
government was in [an] extremely parlous situation” and “to come to terms with [the] 
sects without further delay.”73 Diem’s handling of the sects did not coincide with U.S. 
recommendations, culminating in a standoff between Diem and Hinh in September 1954 
that, in Heath’s mind, confirmed doubts concerning Diem’s leadership ability. Heath 
wrote to Dulles justifying his previous favorable assessments of Diem while arguing that 
Diem’s conflict with Hinh had lost him the “prestige and confidence of the literate, 
articulate sections of the Vietnamese community,” and that no one in the embassy 
believed he could succeed.74 In late October 1954, Eisenhower enacted a crash aid 
program aimed at stabilizing the situation in Saigon that, while not explicitly representing 
a commitment to Diem, signaled a further shift in U.S. policy by channeling aid directly 
to the South Vietnamese government instead of through the French.75 
Eisenhower’s program included a new presidential representative in Saigon 
charged with implementing U.S. aid to effect political stability, General J. Lawton 
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Collins. The envoy’s assessment of Diem initiated the debate in Washington that 
ultimately secured Diem as America’s man in South Vietnam, setting the course that 
determined U.S. commitment to the region for next three decades. Collins’s initial 
assessments were favorable, given Diem’s apparent openness to U.S. reform 
recommendations and signs of increased domestic political support. After months of 
unsuccessful attempts to guide Diem to stabilize South Vietnam’s political environment 
by broadening his government, Collins’s opinion shifted, and he informed Dulles that 
Diem lacked “the capacity to achieve the necessary unity of purpose and action from his 
people which is essential to prevent South Vietnam from falling under Communist 
control.” He further asserted Diem was not “indispensable” to realizing U.S. strategic 
interests in Vietnam.76 Diem still had influential American support, however, and both 
Eisenhower and Dulles feared that attempts to remove Diem would dislodge the 
congressional support being championed by Mansfield. Collins’s argument eventually 
prevailed, however, during a National Security Council (NSC) meeting on April 28, 
1955, and Dulles sent telegrams to the U.S. embassies in Paris and Saigon outlining a 
plan for Diem’s replacement. Dulles immediately blocked the telegrams, however, as 
developments in Saigon fatefully altered Washington’s assessment of Diem’s future.77 
On the same day as the NSC meeting, the Vietnamese National Army 
successfully routed Binh Xuyen forces in Saigon, causing Dulles to send the blocking 
telegrams to leave U.S. policy unchanged until the situation in Saigon became clear. 
When it became apparent that Diem had successfully eliminated the Binh Xuyen, his 
supporters in Washington retrenched their positions and began lobbying the State 
Department in support of the victorious prime minister. Mansfield released a statement 
declaring that Diem remained the only viable nationalist leader with whom the United 
States could advance its interests in the region, an opinion that Diem’s other supporters in 
Congress endorsed. Similar support came from within the administration, as both 
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O’Daniel and Young cabled to Washington arguing that a change in Saigon’s leadership 
would result in further turmoil and that the United States should support Diem.78 
Eisenhower and Dulles were convinced, and Diem became America’s man in South 
Vietnam. In a series of meetings with French Premiere Edgar Faure in May 1955, Dulles 
articulated the U.S. position that Diem was the only viable nationalist leader in South 
Vietnam. He also expressed a justification for Diem’s style of governance that became a 
recurrent theme of U.S. support for his regime, explaining that Western-style democracy 
may not be applicable in Asia, and that Diem exhibited the strong leadership required to 
prevent the spread of communism. At a minimum, the United States needed a strong, 
anticommunist leader in South Vietnam around whom U.S. military aid could prevent a 
DRV victory. Beginning in May 1955, the Eisenhower administration believed that 
strong leader was Ngo Dinh Diem.79 
B. NATIONAL ELECTIONS, THE BAO DAI REFERENDUM, AND THE 
CREATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 
The first issue that both tested the new alliance and illustrated the tone that would 
characterize the relationship between U.S. officials and Diem was the national 
reunification election mandated by the Geneva Accords. The Geneva signatories urged 
U.S. officials and Diem to begin consultations that would lead to a 1956 reunification 
vote. Both British and French officials communicated their fear that a failure to hold the 
elections would cause the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), the communist 
regime that had gained power north of the 17th parallel, to restart an armed conflict.80 
Diem was strongly opposed to the elections, declaring that his government was not a 
signatory of the Geneva Accords or beholden to its articles. He also believed that 
engaging in a dialogue with Hanoi would represent his government’s recognition of the 
DRV’s legitimacy, a position he consistently refused beginning the day he took office.81 
The United States supported Diem’s position, though not for the same reasons as the 
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prime minister. With the rise of the Cold War, democratic institutions became a primary 
U.S. political tool for countering Soviet influence. Chief among these tools was free 
national elections, as had been recently demonstrated in Germany. The situation in 
Vietnam was unique, however, as U.S. officials believed that Diem lacked the domestic 
political support to win the election, and even if he had the support, that the DRV would 
manipulate the election process in the north to ensure a communist victory. So instead of 
pushing for the election, U.S. State Department officials urged Diem to seize the 
initiative by calling for an election dialogue with the communists while demanding 
transparency safeguards so stringent that the DRV would refuse. From the U.S. 
perspective, Diem would be able to avoid the election without incurring criticism from 
the Geneva signatories.82 Despite U.S. urging, Diem still refused to engage with the 
DRV, citing his earlier argument that his government was not bound to the terms of the 
Geneva Accords.83 
The election debate coincided with an East-West summit conference in July 1955. 
U.S. fear that Diem’s intransigence on the election issue would undermine U.S. efforts to 
build international support for his regime was ignited when India called for the chairmen 
of the 1954 Geneva Conference—Great Britain and the Soviet Union—to demand that 
Diem commence preparations for a reunification election. Following India’s request, the 
United States, Great Britain, and France intensified efforts to convince Diem to hold 
election talks so that they could avoid conflict over the issue with the Soviet Union. Diem 
finally relented, releasing a statement that Saigon supported both the idea of free 
elections and the reunification of Vietnam. He also reiterated in the same statement that 
his government was not bound by the Geneva Accords. In a lucky turn of events for the 
United States, the Soviet representatives at the East-West summit conference did not 
earnestly pursue the Vietnamese election issue, and the only outcome pertinent to Saigon 
was a letter from Great Britain and France to Diem urging that he publically express a 
genuine intent to hold free elections.84 Diem responded to the letter in October 1955 
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reiterating his previously argued position, and the election discussion deadlines defined 
by the Geneva Accords expired. China and the Soviet Union objected to Diem’s failure to 
carry out the election talks and, in a November 1955 meeting, declared to U.S., British, 
and French officials that something had to be done to resolve the issue. The United States 
convinced Great Britain and France to take the position that elections were desirable, but 
that talks could only be held upon DRV acceptance of strict transparency conditions.85 
This was the final international discussion on the election issue, and the Geneva deadline 
passed without an election. Diem had exhibited a stubborn resistance to U.S. advice, 
creating diplomatic challenges for the United States in its relations with its British and 
French allies as well as the Soviet Union. The U.S. support of Diem didn’t falter, 
however, as the need for the regime’s success as a barricade against the DRV outweighed 
disappointment with Diem’s conviction to stick with his instincts. The election issue 
illustrated the achievement U.S. goals by way of means defined by Diem. This 
relationship—U.S. goals achieved by Diem-defined means—became a recurring 
characteristic of the alliance. 
Following the election issue, Diem immediately pursued another objective that 
again demonstrated the nature of the Washington-Saigon alliance. Diem assessed Bao 
Dai as a symbol of French interference in Vietnam and as the center of plots aimed to 
undermine the prime minister’s authority, so he moved to replace the emperor as head of 
state. Diem communicated his intention to hold a referendum allowing the Vietnamese 
people to choose between Bao Dai and Diem as head of state during a September 1955 
meeting with the newly appointed U.S. ambassador, Frederick Reinhardt. After the 
referendum, Diem explained, his government would produce a new constitution.86 
Reinhardt cautioned Diem that moving ahead with a referendum and producing a 
constitution without first holding a popular election for a general assembly was contrary 
to democratic principles and would inspire doubt concerning Diem’s popular mandate to 
rule. The ambassador advised that Diem should instead move to create a popularly 
elected general assembly that could then address the Bao Dai issue and create a new 
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constitution.87 Reinhardt’s assessment was not universally shared in the State 
Department. The director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs, 
Kenneth Young, contended that the Western conception of the appropriate balance 
between executive authority and popular mandate may not be applicable to Saigon, and 
that Diem should be afforded the space to determine what balance was right for 
Vietnam.88 Dulles articulated the administration’s position as a balance of the two 
arguments, calling for eventual democratic reforms but prioritizing the immediate need 
for a powerful executive to ensure political stability in South Vietnam.89 
The U.S. position on the proposed referendum ultimately proved irrelevant to 
Diem. Without notifying any U.S. official, Diem held the referendum on October 25, 
1955, winning just over 98.2 percent of the vote.90 Prior to the referendum, Diem’s 
brother Nhu had orchestrated a propaganda campaign in support of the prime minister, 
and campaigning in support of Bao Dai was strictly forbidden.91 Even the method of 
voting helped to ensure a Diem victory. Voters were required to tear a piece of paper 
featuring the images of both Bao Dai and Diem in half, placing their selection in a ballot 
box and discarding the other image on the floor in full view of pro-government 
personnel.92 These methods resulted in the overwhelming victory that included Diem 
earning 200,000 more votes from the Saigon district than there were registered voters.93 
An embassy report to Washington following the referendum described how the 
campaigning and voting processes conflicted with democratic norms and that the 
outcome did not accurately capture the level of domestic support for Diem.94 
Diem exhibited a similar disregard for democratic norms during the March 1956 
national assembly elections. Though pro-regime candidates did face opposition while 
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campaigning, each campaign was reviewed by government electoral committees, and the 
Diem regime disqualified any candidate suspected of rebellious activity.95 Diem’s 
political party, the National Revolutionary Movement (NRM), and other pro-Diem 
candidates won 109 of the 123 seats, ensuring regime control of the National 
Assembly.96 By October 1956, the National Assembly promulgated a new constitution 
that created the RVN and clearly established the presidency as the most powerful office 
in government. Article 3, for example, gave the president authority to establish law by 
decree in between assembly sessions and declare states of emergency that would suspend 
the rule of law.97 The U.S. Embassy had made constitutional experts available to the 
Diem regime. They urged the president to institutionalize democratic norms with a clear 
separation of powers among the branches of government; but as with the referendum, 
U.S. advice had little impact on Diem’s actions.98 
Diem’s policies and actions concerning the reunification vote, the Bao Dai 
referendum, the election of the National Assembly, and the drafting of the RVN 
constitution inspired concern in the minds of many U.S. officials. Ambassador Reinhardt 
assessed Diem’s government as increasingly autocratic, and he also observed that U.S. 
advice was having little influence on the new president of the RVN. Despite official 
concern with Diem’s autocratic style, the Eisenhower administration had what it most 
desired in southern Vietnam—a strong, anticommunist leader around whom U.S. support 
could build a nation capable of resisting communism. Though Diem’s moves to 
consolidate power had not adhered to democratic norms, the administration viewed the 
president as a burgeoning success. The official rationalization of Diem’s autocratic 
behavior was the Western-style democracy may not be applicable to the Asian region, 
and that the strong leadership exhibited by Diem was more important than the immediate 
establishment of truly representative government.  
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C. NATION-BUILDING IN SOUTHERN VIETNAM, 1956–1958 
The friction between Diem and his U.S. advisers exhibited throughout the 
formation of the RVN was similarly apparent in each government’s approach to nation-
building in the late 1950s. The two main areas that further revealed conflict between 
Diem and U.S. officials were land reform and security. Despite a robust U.S. aid and 
advisement program facilitated by the U.S. Operations Mission (USOM), the U.S. 
Military Advisory Assistance Group (MAAG), the Michigan State University Group 
(MSUG), and various additional specialists made available by the State Department, 
Diem pursued a nation-building program of his own design. 
The United States viewed land reform as the means by which Diem could spur 
economic growth in the RVN while establishing a broad base of domestic political 
support for the young regime. When Collins analyzed the political situation in 1954, he 
observed that the majority of the rural population consisted of poor farmers working on 
lands rented at exploitive rates to a small number of absentee landlords, and he urged 
Diem to quickly institute a program of land reform similar to the U.S. programs that were 
successfully implemented in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Japan.99 In June 1955, USOM 
land reform specialist Wolf Ladejinsky met with Diem and expressed the same concern 
as Collins, but Ladejinsky reported to USOM that Diem showed little concern for the 
issues discussed during the meeting.100 Diem appeared to relent to U.S. pressure when he 
issued Ordinance 57 in January 1956, an executive order instructing land reform that 
reflected aspects of the U.S. programs implemented elsewhere in the region. Despite 
initial optimism among State Department officials, the executive order did little to 
implement real reform. A U.S. study conducted in the late 1960s revealed that while the 
government had expropriated a large amount of land from absentee landlords, less than 
half of it was redistributed to poor farming families, and only about 100,000 out of 
millions of poor farming families actually profited from the ordinance.101 
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Diem took a different view of land reform than had been articulated by 
Ladejinsky and other U.S. officials. First, while he agreed that the holdings of the most 
wealthy land owners had to be broken up, Diem asserted that seizing the holdings of 
smaller land owners would destroy the RVN’s rural middle class. Second, he believed 
overpopulation and the underutilization of land were more important issues than land 
ownership reform. Diem’s solution was instead to pursue multiple resettlement programs. 
Diem believed resettlement would solve the overpopulation problem while expanding 
and diversifying the RVN’s agricultural sector. Additionally, Diem believed 
resettlements along the porous borders of Laos and Cambodia would increase security 
against potential communist incursions. Finally, Diem saw the resettlement programs as 
the means of instilling the ideals of individual and communal self-reliance being 
espoused by his regime.102 These programs resulted in the resettlement of thousands of 
poor farmers who were forced by government personnel to work on public development 
programs for no pay. Many officials both within the regime and in the State Department 
saw little difference between Diem’s programs and the earlier forced labor programs of 
the French and Japanese. One iteration of Diem’s resettlement campaign did promise 
land ownership to the participating farmers, but the awarding of ownership was 
contingent on the completion of years of farming for the community.103 
U.S. officials criticized the authoritarian nature of Diem’s resettlement programs 
and attempted to convince the president that he was undermining the security and 
political goals he was trying to achieve among the rural population. Yet even when 
USOM suspended aid for the Land Development program in 1958, Diem continued his 
version of land reform. The total amount of U.S. aid did not change, and Saigon diverted 
aid from other areas to continue their resettlement programs.104 Though Diem’s programs 
significantly contributed to the rural discontent that served as the basis of communist 
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insurgency from mid-1959 onward, U.S. officials continued to justify Diem’s behavior by 
arguing that Western notions of governance may not be applicable in Asia.105 
The increasing American doubt in Diem’s ability inspired by his failing 
resettlement programs had little impact on the Eisenhower administration’s support of 
Saigon, however, as the majority of U.S. aid and advice remained focused on building the 
RVN’s military and internal security apparatus. One area where Diem and U.S. 
representatives did agree was the need to expand the RVN’s military so that it would be 
able to resist the military capability of the DRV. The funding for U.S. military aid flowed 
primarily from the Commercial Import Program (CIP) and was administered by the U.S. 
MAAG mission.106 Though the State Department initially resisted increasing the size of 
the U.S. military mission in South Vietnam for fear such action would be internationally 
perceived as contradicting the Geneva Accords, the United States instituted the 
Temporary Equipment Recovery Mission (TERM) in 1956. TERM was designed as a 
program to account for the U.S. equipment that had been given to the withdrawing 
French troops, but it also provided U.S. military personnel to conduct training of the 
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Additionally, the United States had agreed 
with France in 1954 to limit the size of the ARVN to 100,000, but at Diem’s urging at the 
end of 1955, the Eisenhower administration agreed to raise the limit to 150,000 to 
compensate for the withdrawal of French troops.107 As U.S. international aid budgets 
contracted at the end of the 1950s, the majority of U.S. aid to the RVN remained directed 
to the military.108 
Where Diem and the United States did not agree was the method of dealing with 
the communist operatives that remained south of the 17th parallel. State Department 
officials believed that a program of true land reform would generate economic 
satisfaction among the RVN’s rural population that would translate into political support 
for the regime in Saigon. Therefore, the U.S. argument implied, the communist message 
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would have little appeal among the population, and internal security would be 
achieved.109 Diem disagreed, however, believing that in addition to his resettlement 
programs, a campaign of strict policing and intimidation would more effectively route 
any threat of communist subversion.110 Diem established the Special Commissariat for 
Civic Action in March 1955, a government agency charged with training teams of 
government loyalists to go into villages and identify communists and communist 
sympathizers. Four months later, Diem launched the Denounce Communists Campaign, a 
pro-government indoctrination program combined with the violent targeting of suspected 
communists.111 These programs produced Diem’s desired outcome, as government 
murders and arrests reduced Vietnam Workers’ Party (VWP) in South Vietnam from 
60,000 in 1954 to just under 5,000 by mid-1959.112 But just as with the resettlement 
programs, Diem’s efforts instilled fear and discontent among the RVN population, 
creating the conditions that would be exploited by communist insurgents at the end of 
1959.113 
The doubt among some U.S. policymakers concerning Diem’s record of 
governance in the late 1950s was best captured in the reports of Elbridge Durbrow, 
Reinhardt’s successor as U.S. ambassador in Saigon. At the end of 1957, Durbrow 
reported to Washington that Diem’s authoritarian style of governance was eliminating 
domestic support for his regime, that he was exclusively focused on military development 
at the expense of economic development, and that he was increasingly resistant to U.S. 
advice.114 Not all U.S. officials agreed with Durbrow, though. The director of MAAG, 
General Samuel T. Williams, argued that the primary challenge facing Saigon was 
military in nature, and that U.S. criticism of Diem’s domestic policies only undermined 
MAAG’s efforts.115 Something upon which both Diem’s U.S. supporters and detractors 
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agreed was that no alternative to Diem existed in Saigon. In Diem, Washington had a 
strong, nationalist, anti-communist leader around whom U.S. military aid could prevent 
the spread of communism throughout the region. Using NSC reports, David Anderson 
summarized the Eisenhower administration’s Vietnam policy throughout the late 1950s 
as working toward the development of a free, noncommunist nation in South Vietnam 
that would eventually reunify the entire country by way of free elections. Until then, the 
United States would aid in the defense of free Vietnam while working to undermine the 
influence of communist operatives in South Vietnam. At the very least, U.S. military aid 
would be used to prevent a DRV victory while the United States worked to strengthen the 
other free nations of Southeast Asia.116 Though many U.S. officials were concerned by 
Diem’s intransigence toward U.S. advice and his increasingly authoritarian government, 
he was a nationalist, he was anticommunist, and he had exhibited enough cunning to 
remain in power. For the Eisenhower administration, that was enough to warrant 
continued U.S. support of Saigon. 
D. CONCLUSION 
From 1954–1958, Diem exhibited a style of governance that inspired concern and 
doubt among many U.S. officials. Diem’s regime had become increasingly authoritarian, 
and he appeared to be disproportionately focused on internal security at the expense of 
economic development. His government lacked a meaningful base of domestic political 
support, and his brutal campaign of intimidation and repression aimed at communist 
operatives in the south was creating an environment of fear and distrust among the rural 
population. 
Not all U.S. policymakers concurred with the negative assessment of Diem’s 
government in the late 1950s. The counterargument was that criticism of Diem’s conduct 
domestically was misplaced given conditions in Asia, and that his emphasis on security 
was justified by the threat from the North. This view was supported by the argument that 
Western-style democratic institutions may not be applicable in Asia, and the firm 
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leadership exhibited by Diem was exactly what was required to employ U.S. military aid 
to prevent the spread of communism throughout the region. 
The Eisenhower administration ultimately adopted this second argument—that 
Diem’s strongman leadership was exactly what the RVN needed. The administration 
consistently stated that a free, Western-style democracy was their ultimate goal for 
Vietnam, but it also conceded that the development of Vietnamese democratic institutions 
may require years. In the short term, the minimal U.S. objective was to prevent the spread 
of communism through South Vietnam long enough to strengthen the rest of the region. 
The Eisenhower administration’s evaluation of Diem was that, during the 1950s, he 
consistently exhibited the strength and cunning to remain in power and achieve that 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 41 
IV. DIEM FIGHTS: COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH 
VIETNAM, 1959–1963 
In a letter to President Ngo Dinh Diem celebrating the sixth anniversary of the 
founding of the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) dated October 26, 1961, President John F. 
Kennedy wrote that “America is well aware of the increased intensity which in recent 
months has marked the war against your people, and of the expanding scale and 
frequency of communist attacks” and that “the United States is determined to help 
Vietnam preserve its independence, protect its people against communist assassins, and 
build a better life through economic growth.”117 At the time the letter was written, the 
president was awaiting the return of General Maxwell Taylor, Kennedy’s military adviser 
who was in Saigon attempting to determine why combined U.S. and RVN efforts to 
defeat the communist insurgency over the previous months were failing. The letter 
conveys the American determination to fight communism in South Vietnam, but 
translating that determination into a successful strategy was a major challenge for both 
the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.  
This chapter discusses President Diem’s attempts to battle the communist 
insurgency in South Vietnam supported by the counterinsurgency programs of the 
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations from 1959 through the beginning of 1963. The 
first section examines the conditions in South Vietnam bred by Diem’s nation-building 
programs of the late 1950s and how the Eisenhower administration reinforced the U.S. 
commitment to Diem, attempting to initiate a counterinsurgency program during its final 
months in office. The second section discusses the Kennedy administration’s preliminary 
evaluation of the strategic situation in South Vietnam and its initial attempt to implement 
a counterinsurgency program. The third section evaluates the Taylor mission and how the 
general’s assessment of South Vietnam shaped the U.S. aid program for South Vietnam. 
The fourth section illustrates how Taylor’s recommendations were implemented in a 
revised U.S. counterinsurgency program, and how the effectiveness of that program was 
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evaluated by the Kennedy administration. The final section discusses the conditions 
stemming from the counterinsurgency program implemented by President Diem and his 
brother Ngo Dinh Diem, Senator Mike Mansfield’s assessment of those conditions, and 
the Battle of Ap Bac. 
A. THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION AND 
COUNTERINSURGENCY, 1959–1960 
At the beginning of 1959, it appeared that President Diem’s nation-building and 
national security programs were inspiring the civil unrest and insecurity the programs 
were designed to prevent. Diem’s land reform projects, culminating in the failed 
Agroville Program, shared more in common with the forced labor camps of the colonial 
era than any modern conception of land reform. Forced relocation and unpaid labor 
inspired widespread anger among the rural population focused on Diem’s government.118 
Similarly, though the program had significantly reduced the number of active members in 
the Vietnam Workers’ Party (VWP) in South Vietnam, the Denounce Communists 
Campaign facilitated the further alienation of the rural population from the Saigon 
regime. The Civic Action groups that initially implemented the campaign consisted 
largely of northerners who had fled south in 1954, and the hostility and arrogance with 
which they executed their duties aroused suspicion and distrust among the southern 
villagers. Government attempts to convince the rural population to disavow the southern 
communists conflicted with the widespread memory that the Vietminh were responsible 
for repelling the French colonialists. Finally, the campaign was brutally violent and 
wrought with corruption. Presidential ordinances enacted by Diem in early 1956 
permitted local officials to imprison, interrogate, and execute suspected communists or 
communist sympathizers outside of the judicial system. Thousands of Vietnamese were 
imprisoned and tortured for years without trial. Corrupt local officials often exploited the 
ordinances for various reasons aimed at personal gain, increasing the number of 
noncommunists targeted by the campaign.119 
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Diem’s campaign of violence and the growing level of discontent throughout the 
countryside of South Vietnam caused both the southern communists and the Central 
Committee in Hanoi to reevaluate their strategy in the South. Though they continued to 
plead with Hanoi to authorize a transition to a strategy of violent resistance, by the 
middle of 1958, the southern communists began organizing independently to defend 
themselves and engage the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN).120 The southern 
communists—now labeled the Viet Cong, or Vietnamese Communists, by the Diem 
regime—also began assassinating local government officials by the hundreds.121 At the 
beginning of 1959, future General Secretary of the Central Committee Le Duan toured 
South Vietnam and determined the concerns of southern operatives to be valid, and he 
advocated for a return to revolutionary warfare tactics upon returning to Hanoi. The May 
1959 communique released by the Central Committee was tempered by those in Hanoi 
who urged caution in the pursuit of military objectives, stating that the primary focus of 
the southern campaign would remain political subversion. The communique did, 
however, recognize the security predicament of the southern communists by authorizing 
small-scale armed operations in support of the overall political objective. Hanoi’s 
decision to recommence an armed struggled resulted in the return to South Vietnam of 
90,000 communists who had fled north in 1954, an increase in small-scale uprising 
throughout the RVN countryside, and the murder of thousands of RVN government and 
army officials throughout 1959.122 
U.S. officials and the Diem regime both recognized that a new strategy was 
required to address the sharp rise in insurgent activity, but, repeating the pattern of the 
previous six years, there was strong disagreement both between Washington and Saigon 
and within Washington concerning the form such a strategy should take. Diem wanted to 
increase the size of the majority Catholic and loyal Civil Guard to undertake 
counterinsurgency operations, and he wanted to maintain direct control of the force 
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through his Ministry of Defense.123 U.S. officials disagreed with Diem’s plan, suspicious 
that the president was being opportunistic and attempting to increase what he viewed as a 
loyal force to balance against the ARVN. Additionally, many in Washington thought the 
Civil Guard would be more appropriately employed as an internal police force, and that 
counterinsurgency operations should be left to the ARVN.124 
The rising insurgency also resumed the debate in Washington concerning the root 
of Saigon’s challenges. Though there was disagreement over whether the primary threat 
was the insurgency or a potential conventional invasion by the DRV, the Pentagon and 
U.S. Military Advisory Assistance Group (MAAG) commander General Williams 
viewed the deteriorating conditions in South Vietnam as a military problem, arguing for 
continued military aid to secure the region.125 Ambassador Durbrow disagreed, arguing 
that the crisis in Saigon was political in nature. Citing intelligence that had been captured 
from the Viet Cong, Durbrow communicated to Washington that a majority of the rural 
population was alienated from the Diem regime, and that the only development program 
that Diem seemed serious about was increasing the size and strength of his military. 
Embassy economic statistics also revealed that the RVN’s economy was excessively 
dependent on the U.S. government, with more than 70 percent of foreign trade consisting 
of U.S. aid.126 
Despite Durbrow’s concerns, the Eisenhower administration continued to hold to 
its view that Diem was a credible nationalist, an anticommunist, and that there were no 
viable alternative leaders in Saigon. The administration began drafting an insurgency plan 
that focused on military problems while instructing the embassy to continue efforts to 
urge Diem to broaden the political base of his administration and institute economic and 
military reforms.127 Diem remained obstinate, however, refusing to institute reforms or 
broaden participation in what was increasingly becoming a familial dictatorship. The 
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blatant corruption aimed at maintaining regime control of the national assembly exhibited 
in the August 1960 election was further evidence that Diem was unconcerned with 
liberalizing his government.128 The political environment continued to deteriorate in 
Saigon through the summer and fall of 1960. Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs 
J. Graham Parsons summarized the circumstances he observed during an October 1960 
visit to Saigon as “the eleventh hour.”129 
On November 10, 1960, ARVN paratroopers led by Colonel Vuong Van Dong 
stormed the presidential palace in a poorly coordinated and ultimately unsuccessful 
attempted coup. Though the paratroopers successfully isolated Diem and demanded a 
promise for reforms in return for the president’s release, loyal ARVN forces entered the 
capital and ended the coup on November 12.130 The attempted coup did not inspire Diem 
to reform its government, but it did cause a major strain in U.S.-RVN relations. During 
the coup, Durbrow had remained neutral, refusing Diem’s request to deploy U.S. Marines 
and—with Washington’s consent—attempted to facilitate a compromise with the 
paratroopers that would somehow include Diem in a new government. Durbrow’s 
decision not to immediately support him enraged Diem and made him suspicious of the 
U.S. embassy’s commitment to his government.131 The coup also restarted the strategy 
debate between the State Department and the Pentagon concerning the U.S. commitment 
to Diem and the nature of the problems that were undermining the war effort. The debate 
was deferred while the Eisenhower administration spent its final months in office focused 
on the deteriorating situation in Laos and prepared to turn over to the newly elected 
Kennedy administration.132 
Through its last day in office, the Eisenhower administration maintained the 
policy that Ngo Dinh Diem was the only viable leader around whom to build a 
noncommunist nation in South Vietnam, and thus to prevent the dominos from falling 
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throughout Southeast Asia. The U.S. aid program had been predominately military in 
nature, and Diem’s refusal to accede to American advice to reform his government and 
institute economic reforms was received by the administration with patience as a 
culturally appropriate style of governance. By the early days of 1961, that policy had 
helped to produce a politically unstable RVN. Southern Vietnamese communists, now 
united with noncommunist, antigovernment nationalists under the banner of the National 
Liberation Front (NLF), exploited those conditions to wage a robust and expanding 
insurgency. Though the Eisenhower administration had begun to address the need for a 
counterinsurgency program, it passed to its successor an incomplete strategy and a Diem 
regime highly distrustful of U.S. intentions in South Vietnam. 
B. THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION’S APPROACH TO 
COUNTERINSURGENCY 
The Kennedy administration entered the White House with a theory of 
containment that differed from Eisenhower’s in terms of means, but maintained the 
primacy of South Vietnam’s survival in the achievement of U.S. strategic interests in 
Southeast Asia. The Kennedy administration’s containment strategy, known as “Flexible 
Response,” aimed to establish the U.S. ability to respond to a Soviet threat in any region 
of the globe without risking nuclear war.133 This strategy was shaped in part by 
Kennedy’s belief that Third World revolutionary conflicts were a frontline of the Cold 
War, a conviction reinforced by Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s January 1961 promise of 
Soviet support for “wars of national liberation.”134 Within this context, South Vietnam 
still represented the domino that, if left to fall, would lead to the loss of the entire 
Southeast Asian region to the communist bloc. Though he did believe that the United 
States was overextended in its Southeast Asian commitments, Kennedy also believed that 
failure to see those commitments through would send a disastrous signal of U.S. 
weakness to its allies elsewhere in the world.135 
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Immediately following his inauguration, Kennedy received a dire appraisal of the 
situation in South Vietnam from Brigadier General Lansdale. Having just returned from a 
tour of Saigon, Lansdale reported that recent Viet Cong victories in the regions around 
Saigon and popular discontent with the Diem regime were evidence that both 
governments needed to adopt an immediate change in strategy to avoid a communist 
victory. In his assessment, Lansdale made it clear that Diem remained the only capable 
leader in Saigon. Furthermore, he asserted that after his conduct during the November 
1960 coup, Durbrow no longer enjoyed Diem’s trust and should be replaced as 
ambassador.136 The administration also received a draft counterinsurgency plan from the 
U.S. embassy reflecting Diem’s request to increase the ARVN by 20,000 and increase 
funding for a MAAG-led training program for the Civil Guard.137 Following a meeting 
with his advisers on January 28, 1961, Kennedy authorized the requested increase in 
ARVN size and the MAAG training program for the Civil Guard. The president also 
directed the formation of an interagency task force to advise the administration and the 
embassy on the implementation of a more complete counterinsurgency program. Finally, 
Kennedy designated Frederick Nolting as Durbrow’s replacement as U.S. Ambassador to 
the RVN. The meeting did not involve debate concerning Diem’s viability as an ally in 
South Vietnam, indicating the administration’s concurrence with Lansdale’s assessment 
that Diem remained the only option in Saigon.138 
While the administration switched its focus away from Vietnam to the 
deterioration of the Royal Lao government and the possibility of a communist Pathet Lao 
victory in Laos, the newly established Vietnam interagency task force set to developing a 
more comprehensive counterinsurgency and aid program for South Vietnam. The main 
conflict within the task force reflected the same debate that had characterized discussions 
of South Vietnam—whether the primary challenge to the Saigon regime was political in 
nature. Some officials in Washington, like Special Counsel to the President Theodore C. 
Sorenson, believed that the key to a successful counterinsurgency program was political 
                                                 
136 Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 249; Kaiser, American Tragedy, 66–67. 
137 Duiker, U.S. Containment Policy, 249. 
138 Ibid., 250–52. 
 48 
reform. Diem had inspired some hope within the administration in early February 1961 
when he announced plans to reform his government and delegate authority to the local 
level, but that hope quickly vanished as Diem refused to expand government authority 
beyond the inner circle of his family.139 Prior to being relieved by Nolting, Durbrow 
recommended to Washington that future aid should be made contingent upon Diem’s 
assurance to reform his government and implement the U.S. counterinsurgency 
program.140 Military leaders like MAAG chief General Lionel C. McGarr and Lansdale 
asserted that the primary threat to the Saigon regime was a security problem that needed 
to be immediately addressed with military aid, and that political reforms would be 
meaningless absent a secure environment.141 The task force report submitted to the 
president in April 1961 reflected the emphasis on the military nature of the problem, 
calling for an increase in the MAAG mission to support training of the 20,000 additional 
ARVN troops for counterinsurgency operations and U.S. financial support of the entire 
Civil Guard. On May 11, 1961, Kennedy approved National Security Action 
Memorandum (NSAM)-52, which approved the MAAG increase and financial support of 
the Civil Guard. It also directed further study of possible future increases in ARVN size 
and instructed Nolting to commence discussions with Diem concerning a possible 
defense treaty.142 The Kennedy administration’s first official policy on Vietnam 
emphasized the military nature of the problem, recognized Diem as a viable ally, and 
reaffirmed Eisenhower’s evaluation of Vietnam as critical to U.S. strategic interests. 
Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson traveled to Saigon in May 1961 to deliver a 
letter of presidential support to Diem that outlined the U.S. counterinsurgency program. 
The letter also urged the president to adopt a program of economic and political reform. 
Diem welcomed the news of increased military support, but he resisted the reform by 
asserting he would pursue reforms that were suitable for his country. He also stated the 
RVN had no interest in entering into a defense treaty with the United States. Upon 
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returning to Washington, Johnson reported to Kennedy that the dire economic conditions 
of South Vietnam, and not communism, were the main threat to Diem’s regime.143 
Shortly after Johnson’s departure, Diem submitted a request to Washington for an 
increase to the ARVN of 30,000 troops.144 Diem’s request coincided with a deteriorating 
situation in Laos in favor of the communists, and administration officials began to fear 
that communist infiltration of South Vietnam through Laos would increase.145 Diem’s 
request and the Laos situation inspired the Kennedy administration to reevaluate the U.S. 
strategy in Southeast Asia. The Vietnam task force’s evaluation revisited the debate 
concerning the military versus political nature of Saigon’s challenges and if military aid 
should be exploited to force Diem to institute reforms lest he lose U.S. support. The task 
force’s conclusions reflected the conventional wisdom of the past few years: the United 
States must prevent further communist victory in Southeast Asia by strengthening its 
allies, the DRV was the primary threat, and the United States should be prepared to 
intervene militarily in the event of a conventional invasion by the DRV.146 A second 
presidential letter to Diem in August 1961 conveyed a commitment to dealing with the 
problem militarily, informing the president that Kennedy had authorized the additional 
increase in ARVN troops. That same month, the administration released NSAM-65, 
which, while conceding that security was pointless absent a meaningful reform program, 
underscored that the primary aim of the U.S. aid program was national security. The 
proposal of using of military aid to force Diem to institute reforms was rejected.147 
C. THE TAYLOR MISSION 
As the summer of 1961 came to a close, the Kennedy administration began 
receiving worrying reports of increased infiltration of communist personnel and supplies 
into Southern Vietnam. Diem expressed similar concern, and following successful raids 
carried out by the NLF in September 1961 within miles of Saigon, the president reversed 
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position and submitted a request to Washington for a bilateral defense treaty. The 
administration delayed responding to the request as it received reports from Saigon of 
widespread discontent with the Diem regime.148 Desiring a clearer picture of the situation 
in South Vietnam, Kennedy ordered a delegation led by General Maxwell Taylor on a 
fact-finding mission to Saigon in October 1961. Taylor’s initial report transmitted from 
Saigon painted a grim picture. He reported that the South Vietnamese had no confidence 
in Diem’s government or in the U.S. commitment to the country’s survival, and that the 
communists were exploiting the situation and nearing a victory by subversion. In 
interviews with multiple government and ARVN officials, Taylor repeatedly heard 
evidence of widespread dissatisfaction with the Diem regime and the president’s refusal 
to reform his government or institute meaningful economic or social reforms. General 
Duong Van Minh, commander of the ARVN Field Command, told Taylor that Diem’s 
religious partiality in favor of Catholics and his attempts to control the population 
through inept local officials had lost him the support of the entire South Vietnamese 
population.149 
Taylor returned to Washington in early November 1961 and delivered his final 
report to the president. Viewing the crisis in South Vietnam as a security problem, 
Taylor’s recommendations were mostly military in nature. His report suggested that 
additional presidential letters of support be sent to Diem along with a joint resolution of 
support from Congress that communicated a commitment to preventing a communist 
victory in South Vietnam. It also recommended that the administration publicize the 
communist infiltration of the south and seek condemnation of the DRV by the United 
Nations for violating the 1954 Geneva Accords. Taylor called for the provision of 
additional air, naval, and logistics units to the RVN along with an 8,000-man contingent 
of U.S. troops. Taylor explained that the troops would aid in disaster relief efforts 
following a recent severe flood of the Mekong Delta region and, more importantly, serve 
as a show of good faith to the Diem regime. Reflecting the Kennedy administration’s 
view that the communist insurgency in South Vietnam was a part of the global campaign 
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being waged from the Soviet Union, Taylor suggested urging Moscow to exert its 
influence over Hanoi to end the armed resistance. Finally, Taylor recommend that a more 
aggressive stance be taken with Diem to compel the president to reform the RVN 
government to include a broader base of political participation.150 Kennedy did not react 
to any of the recommendations with the exception of communicating that he was 
absolutely opposed to the direct involvement of U.S. troops, and he referred Taylor’s 
report to his advisers for further study.151 
The debate over the Taylor report centered on the issue of U.S. troop 
involvement. Secretary of State Dean Rusk supported a majority of Taylor’s proposals, 
especially the suggestion to communicate U.S. determination in Southeast Asia to 
Moscow. He assessed that the direct involvement of U.S. troops was too large a 
commitment to investment in the Diem regime, given the precariousness of the Diem 
regime and the possibility that such a move could provoke a Soviet or Chinese military 
response.152 Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, articulating an opinion shared by 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, took an opposing view. Not only did he support each of Taylor’s 
recommendations including the deployment of U.S. troops, McNamara believed that the 
proposed contingent size was insufficient to address the RVN’s national security 
deficiencies and advised the president to consider 8,000 troops the first step in a much 
larger deployment.153 
The final draft of a joint memo from the Departments of Defense and State on the 
issue was submitted for the president’s consideration on November 11, 1961. The memo 
conveyed the logic of Eisenhower’s domino theory, adding that the loss of South 
Vietnam to the DRV would lead not only to Southeast Asia’s assimilation into the 
communist bloc but to the erosion of allies’ trust in the United States throughout the 
world. It was imperative, therefore, for the United States to commit to ensuring the 
continued independence of the RVN, even if to do so would require the deployment of 
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U.S. forces. The memo recognized the weakness of the Diem regime, but it also pointed 
out that the primary challenge in South Vietnam was defeating the communist insurgency 
to establish a stable national security.154 The debate among Kennedy’s foreign policy 
advisers never addressed the argument concerning whether it was insufficient military aid 
or Diem’s refusal to adequately address the political challenges plaguing his nation that 
was at the root of the crisis in Saigon, and the final memo continued the Kennedy policy 
that South Vietnam was a security problem that called for a military solution. Also, 
despite reports of Diem’s ineffective and failing government having played a large role in 
motivating the president to send a fact-finding mission to Saigon, and that Taylor had 
returned with reports that Diem’s domestic support was nearly nonexistent, the majority 
of the U.S. foreign policy staff appears to have accepted that increased security would 
help to rectify Diem’s deficiencies.155 The administration was certainly not blind to 
Diem’s weaknesses, and some leading officials in the State Department were vocal in 
opposition to recommendations for an increased commitment to the Diem regime.156 The 
final memo, however, reflected the assessment that Diem remained the appropriate focal 
point for a U.S. military aid program. 
The Kennedy administration’s final opinions concerning the Taylor report were 
reflected in NSAM-111 issued on November 22, 1961. The president endorsed each of 
Taylor’s recommendations with the exception of those that called for the direct 
commitment of U.S. troops and a public declaration of U.S. commitment to preventing 
the fall of South Vietnam to communism. Kennedy agreed with Rusk’s assessment 
concerning the commitment of U.S. troops, adding that there would be no Congressional 
support for such an endeavor. He did, however, approve further study to prepare for the 
potential deployment of U.S. troops to South Vietnam in the future.157 With the structure 
of the U.S. military aid program to the RVN in place, the Kennedy administration turned 
to planning its implementation through a revised counterinsurgency campaign. 
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D. REVISION OF U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH VIETNAM 
Following the Kennedy administration’s endorsement of the new U.S. military aid 
program to South Vietnam, Nolting met with Diem to discuss the details of the policy. 
Nolting communicated that the United States expected to be consulted in the 
determination of any RVN military, political, and economic policy that concerned 
national security. He also explained that the availability of future aid would be contingent 
upon the cooperation of the Diem regime in the broadening of its government. While 
Diem initially appeared receptive to the demands, Nolting later learned from a member of 
Diem’s staff that the president feared the shift in policy was precursor to a U.S. 
withdrawal from South Vietnam.158 On November 22, 1961, the U.S. embassy presented 
Diem with a series of recommended reforms to broaden his government, the substance of 
which was nearly identical to the suggestions forwarded to Diem by General Collins in 
1954. They included broadening Diem’s cabinet to include opposition politicians, the 
easing of strict censorship laws to appease Saigon’s intelligentsia, and a number of 
economic reforms to win the support of the rural population. Diem expressed outrage at 
the suggestions, telling Nolting that this attempt at U.S. interference smacked of 
colonialism and that such reforms were unsuitable for Vietnamese society. Furthermore, 
Diem reemphasized his conviction that the true source of his regime’s instability was the 
insecurity caused by the communist insurgents, and that addressing the security issue was 
the priority of his government. In the early days of the new U.S. aid program in South 
Vietnam, the U.S. embassy was engaged in the same exact argument with the Diem 
regime that had beset the Eisenhower administration in 1954.159 
While the embassy in Saigon continued to urge Diem to broaden his government, 
officials in Washington debated the new counterinsurgency strategy. Over the objections 
of State Department officials who believed that the establishment of a new military 
command in Vietnam would signal too large a focus on security to Diem, the Kennedy 
administration commissioned the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) 
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in January 1962 to execute the counterinsurgency campaign.160 A few months earlier, 
MAAG officials had developed a three-phased plan that called for clearing communist-
held areas with conventional forces, shifting responsibility for the cleared area’s security 
to the Civil Guard, and ultimately transferring control to civilian government officials 
who would institute economic reform programs under the protection of the Self-Defense 
Corps.161 During his tour of Saigon, General Taylor had discussed the plan with Diem, 
but the president was resistant, declaring his government already had a strategy in 
place.162 That plan was the design of Robert G. K. Thompson, a British adviser that had 
briefed the Pentagon on the details of his counterinsurgency operation before traveling to 
Saigon in November 1960. Contrary to the MAAG plan, Thompson’s strategy called for 
the gradual reclamation of the countryside through the construction of strategic hamlets 
with a strong emphasis on the Self-Defense Corps, who would train the rural population 
to defend themselves.163 The Pentagon criticized the plan for underemphasizing 
conventional military operations, and the State Department was concerned the reliance on 
the Self-Defense Corps inappropriately afforded Diem direct control of the operations.164 
The plan had support in the White House, however, and the final plan approved by the 
Kennedy administration and authorized by Diem on March 19, 1962 was a revision of 
Thompson’s original strategy. It centered on a strategic hamlet construction program in 
South Vietnam’s rural regions supported by U.S. aid, materials, and advice.165 
Though the two governments had agreed upon a counterinsurgency strategy, the 
visions of implementation varied greatly between Washington and Saigon. At the end of 
March 1962, Diem installed his brother Nhu as the chief of the program, now called 
Operation Sunrise. While U.S. officials urged him to pursue a gradual program to prove 
the strategic hamlet concept, Nhu began the widespread construction of hamlets 
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throughout the country.166 The Kennedy administration attempted to monitor the 
program through provincial survey teams, but Diem restricted the scope of their reporting 
to military matters and denied access to local government officials, limiting their access 
to the ministry officials in Saigon. Even with restricted monitoring capability, officials at 
the U.S. embassy and MACV began to see indications that Diem and Nhu were 
replicating the errors of the failed Agroville Program by forcibly relocating the rural 
population, providing insufficient supplies to build the hamlets, and demanding that the 
population build the hamlets without compensation because, according to Diem, “the 
peasants had plenty of time on their hands and needed no pay.”167 Notwithstanding these 
worrying developments, the administration began to evaluate Operation Sunrise as a 
success. Returning from a visit to Saigon in May 1962, McNamara was enthusiastic 
about the strategic hamlet program.168 Administration officials had also soundly rejected 
the option of attempting to replicate the Laotian negotiated settlement in South Vietnam, 
citing the Pentagon’s optimistic statistical evaluation of Operation Sunrise’s 
effectiveness.169 Kennedy even directed McNamara to develop a plan to beginning 
withdrawing U.S. military advisers from South Vietnam.170 The Kennedy administration 
believed it had finally found the path to achieving its strategic goals in South Vietnam. 
E. THE MANSFIELD TRIP AND THE BATTLE OF AP BAC 
By the end of 1962, administration officials began to doubt the hopeful 
assessment of South Vietnam being espoused by McNamara and the Pentagon. 
Apparently, the information transmitted from Saigon did not represent a truthful 
assessment of Operation Sunrise. For example, during McNamara’s visit to Saigon in 
May 1962, MACV chief General Paul Haskins had changed a map for the secretary’s 
intelligence briefing to significantly understate the extent of Viet Cong control of the 
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countryside.171 The U.S. mission in Hue described the program in the central regions of 
South Vietnam as “pure façade,” reporting that Ngo Dinh Canh, whom Nhu had charged 
with implementing Operation Sunrise in the region, spent more time expanding his 
personal militia than erecting strategic hamlets. The mission also reported that the forced 
labor appeared to be inspiring nearly one-third of the hamlet’s new residents to support 
the Viet Cong.172 The embassy in Saigon also communicated to Washington that 
optimistic assessments of the operation where false, the situation favored the Viet Cong, 
and the source of the operation’s failure was the estrangement of the rural population by 
the policies of Diem and Nhu. 
In November 1962, Kennedy requested that Senator Mike Mansfield lead a 
senatorial delegation to South Vietnam in an effort to evaluate the true progress of 
Operation Sunrise and the political environment in Saigon. When he returned to 
Washington in December, Mansfield submitted a troubling report to the president and 
Congress. He assessed that despite years of intensive American aid, the situation in South 
Vietnam was much worse than in 1954. A former stalwart defender of Diem in Congress, 
Mansfield now believed that he was incapable of facilitating U.S. interests in the region, 
and in his old age was passing power to his brother, Nhu. If Operation Sunrise continued 
to fail, Mansfield argued, the only way to save South Vietnam would be with a large-
scale commitment of U.S. troops. He concluded by suggesting that unless the position in 
South Vietnam was critical to U.S. strategic interests, the administration should consider 
pursuing a policy of neutralization for the entire Southeast Asia region. Though the 
president was initially shocked and angered by the report, he ultimately concurred with 
Mansfield’s assessment.173 
Shortly after Mansfield’s trip, the United States received additional evidence 
challenging the effectiveness of its military aid program at the Battle of Ap Bac. On 
January 2, 1963, the ARVN learned the location of a contingent of Viet Cong insurgents 
at a series of hamlets in the Dinh Tuong province from intercepted radio transmissions. A 
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force consisting of an ARVN battalion, two Civil Guard battalions, and a company of 
ARVN armored personnel carriers led by General Huynh Van Cao and advised by U.S. 
Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann attacked the hamlets in an attempt to clear the 
insurgents. The Viet Cong contingent of 300 men was well prepared for a defense, 
shooting down a total of five U.S. helicopters carrying ARVN troops. The aggressive and 
disciplined Viet Cong firepower halted the ARVN advance, and the armored personnel 
carriers refused to advance and rescue the survivors from the downed helicopters. With 
the ARVN paralyzed and unwilling to fight, the Viet Cong fighters escaped during the 
night, suffering 18 casualties compared to the ARVN’s 80 along with three U.S. 
advisers.174 The Kennedy administration now had evidence that not only was the U.S. 
counterinsurgency failing to produce positive results, but that the conventional military 
buildup that had been occurring in South Vietnam for nearly eight years was similarly 
failing to achieve its objective. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Examination of U.S. foreign policy in South Vietnam from 1959 through the 
beginning of 1963 reveals three similarities between the Eisenhower and Kennedy 
administrations’ strategies for containing communism in Southeast Asia: the evaluation 
of the strategic importance of South Vietnam, the framing of the situation as a military 
problem, and the suitability of the Diem regime as the focal point of U.S. containment 
policy. 
Though Eisenhower’s New Look and Kennedy’s Flexible Response represented 
different and sometimes conflicting approaches to containment policy, the application of 
both strategies to Southeast Asia resulted in similar programs in South Vietnam. Both 
administrations assessed South Vietnam as a frontline in the Cold War and equated its 
potential loss as a crisis in terms of Eisenhower’s domino theory. Both presidents were 
also adamantly opposed to sending U.S. troops to South Vietnam, believing the 
appropriate course of action to be the application of U.S. military aid and advice to 
strengthen the RVN as a bulwark against communism. 
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Eisenhower and Kennedy understood South Vietnam’s primary challenge as a 
national security problem that required a military solution. Both administrations also had 
high-level officials that voiced their disagreement with that assessment. Ambassador 
Durbrow communicated to both Eisenhower and Kennedy that he believed the root of the 
problem was the Saigon regime, and that a program of military aid was wasted effort 
without meaningful political, economic, and social reforms from Diem. Officials at the 
embassy time and again reported that Diem’s autocratic style of leadership was alienating 
the South Vietnamese population and that his government enjoyed little to no domestic 
support. Still, the final aid programs approved by the White House from 1959 through 
1962 emphasized the primacy of defeating the insurgency militarily. Each version of the 
program did direct the embassy to continue urging Diem to broaden his government and 
institute economic reforms to win over the rural population, but the president remained 
intransigent. Though Kennedy eventually authorized Ambassador Nolting to use U.S. 
military aid as bargaining chip to compel reforms from Diem, the president never 
yielded, and funds and equipment flowed uninterrupted from Washington to Saigon. 
Finally, whenever the debate arose concerning whether or not Diem was the 
appropriate leader around whom to center U.S. policy, the same argument ended the 
discussion: he was anticommunist, he was a nationalist, he was independent, and there 
was no viable alternative in Saigon. His apparent weaknesses were not enough to alter the 
administrations’ strategic evaluation of South Vietnam, so despite his refusal to accede to 
U.S. advice and his conviction to form the RVN in his own image, Diem and his 
government enjoyed the continued support of the United States from 1959 through the 
end of 1962. In the early days of 1963, however, both Senator Mansfield’s dire 
assessment of South Vietnam and the disastrous performance of the ARVN troops at Ap 
Bac signaled the beginning of the end of the Diem experiment. 
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V. THE FAILURE OF THE DIEM EXPERIMENT 
During a televised interviewed with Walter Cronkite on September 2, 1963, 
President John F. Kennedy shared his analysis of the U.S.-Republic of Vietnam (RVN) 
war effort against the Viet Cong, stating that the “[United States is] prepared to continue 
to assist [the RVN], but I don’t think that the war can be won unless the people support 
the effort and, in my opinion, in the last 2 months, the government has gotten out of touch 
with the people.”175 When asked if he thought the RVN still had an opportunity to 
reform, gain domestic support, and defeat the communists, the president answered in the 
affirmative, stating that “with changes in policy and perhaps with personnel I think it can. 
If it doesn’t make those changes, I think the chances of winning it would not be very 
good.”176 During 1963, the Kennedy administration began to conclude that the failures of 
the Diem regime were undermining the military campaign against the Viet Cong. This 
assessment did not translate directly into support for a coup, however, as the 
administration struggled to evaluate viable successors to Diem in Saigon and the potential 
for a coup’s success. The complex and volatile nature of Saigon’s political environment 
in 1963 made the United States ambivalent about a coup, an ambivalence that persisted 
even after the Kennedy administration signaled support to the Army of the Republic of 
Vietnam (ARVN) generals who ultimately deposed Diem. 
This chapter evaluates the erosion of the U.S.-RVN partnership during 1963, 
which resulted in the Kennedy administration’s assent to an ARVN coup. The first 
section illustrates how differences between Washington’s and Saigon’s evaluations of the 
Diem regime’s effectiveness and the main challenges facing the government following 
the Mansfield trip and the Battle of Ap Bac led to the deterioration of U.S.-RVN relations 
during the early months of 1963. The second and third sections discuss the Buddhist 
Crisis and how Diem’s violent crackdown on South Vietnamese Buddhists led the 
Kennedy administration to support ARVN coup plans for August 1963. The fourth 
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section examines the period following the ARVN generals’ postponement of the August 
coup plans and the Kennedy administration’s return to a strongly divided debate 
concerning U.S. support of Diem. The final section illustrates how, just as the Kennedy 
administration decided to pursue a policy not to encourage a coup, the ARVN generals 
informed the embassy that a coup was imminent, beginning the series of events that led to 
Diem’s removal and assassination on November 2, 1963. 
A. DECLINE OF THE U.S.–RVN PARTNERSHIP, JANUARY–MAY 1963 
Despite the negative tone of Mansfield’s report and the poor performance of the 
ARVN at Ap Bac, the Kennedy administration remained sharply divided over U.S. policy 
in South Vietnam during the early months of 1963. Roger Hilsman, the director of the 
Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department, returned from a trip to 
Saigon in January with the assessment that discontent with the Diem regime was 
escalating both among the population and within the senior levels of government.177 
Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles wrote to the president in March arguing that the 
United States should signal its receptiveness to “alternative leadership” in Saigon if Diem 
did not implement reforms.178 Other administration officials remained resistant to 
adopting a policy of regime change, citing a lack of viable replacements for Diem. In an 
April visit to Washington, British counterinsurgency specialist Robert G. K. Thompson 
told administration officials that removal of Diem would ensure a communist victory 
within months.179 Officials wary of regime change also cited U.S. Military Assistance 
Command, Vietnam (MACV) reports that war efforts against the Viet Cong in the 
countryside were showing promising improvement. Those assessments were supported 
by an April National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) that also optimistically evaluated the 
war effort.180 Despite the rising tension in Saigon, the administration concluded that the 
                                                 





challenges posed by the Diem regime were tolerable given the continued success of the 
military operation against the Viet Cong.181 
In Saigon, Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu did not concur with the negative 
U.S. assessment of the ARVN’s performance at Ap Bac. In the final months of 1962, 
both Diem and Nhu began to believe that the battle for South Vietnam’s countryside was 
moving steadily in the government’s favor. They also believed that 1963 would bring a 
final Viet Cong effort to displace the regime, and they assessed the Battle of Ap Bac as 
the beginning of that effort. Nhu conceded that mistakes had been made at Ap Bac, but he 
also argued that the ARVN would use the lessons of the battle to ensure the future defeat 
of the Viet Cong. Pro-regime newspapers in Saigon even published headlines that 
claimed the ARVN had prevailed at Ap Bac.182 For Diem and Nhu, defeat of the 
insurgency was prelude to their larger plans for combating communism in 1963. They 
believed the North Vietnamese population would be inspired to replicate the supposedly 
successful Strategic Hamlet Program in the North, repelling the communists from the 
countryside and facilitating Vietnam’s reunification under Saigon’s leadership.183 The 
brothers also intended to expand their military campaign to target the communists in 
Laos.184 Where U.S. officials found reason for cautious optimism regarding the 
counterinsurgency campaign, combined with grave concern regarding the government in 
Saigon, the Ngo brothers found evidence that the realization of their vision of Vietnam’s 
reunification was imminent. 
High confidence in the effectiveness of their policies shaped the reactions of both 
Diem and Nhu to the publication of the Mansfield report. Assuming that the Mansfield 
report signaled an impending change in U.S. policy away from supporting the regime, 
both Diem and Nhu began to push for a U.S. withdrawal that coincided with their 
plans.185 During 1962, the number of civilians working at the U.S. Operations Mission 
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(USOM) had doubled and the number of military advisers working a MACV had 
increased tenfold. The brothers compared the large U.S. mission to French colonialists, 
accusing the United States of attempting to make South Vietnam a protectorate and 
calling for a reduction in the mission’s size.186 Nhu made these complaints public in a 
May 1963 Washington Post interview in which he claimed half of the U.S. advisers in 
South Vietnam were not required.187 Diem and Nhu also moved to limit both the type of 
aid that South Vietnam accepted from the United States and the U.S. role in determining 
how that aid should be employed. Specifically, Diem informed Ambassador Nolting that 
U.S. aid would no longer flow through the Provincial Rehabilitation Committees. These 
three-member panels, which consisted of a Vietnamese province chief and 
representatives from MACV and USOM, enabled U.S. advisers to play a large role in 
shaping the counterinsurgency campaign.188 
Washington’s reaction to Nhu’s interview and Diem’s proposed aid limitations 
was fervently negative. Some within the administration saw the Washington Post 
interview as proof that Nhu was unequivocally anti-American.189 Rufus Phillips, a 
former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative working in Saigon as a 
counterinsurgency adviser, asserted in a memo that removal of U.S. influence in the 
counterinsurgency campaign by eliminating the Provincial Rehabilitation Committees 
would ensure a Viet Cong victory.190 Tensions between the United States and the RVN 
were higher than ever, and the U.S. embassy in Saigon feared the partnership was nearing 
a “breaking point.”191 
The Ngo brothers apparently did not expect such a strong, negative response from 
the Kennedy administration, and they quickly moved to ease the tension in the U.S.-RVN 
partnership. Nhu claimed to have been misrepresented by the authors of the Washington 
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Post interview, withdrawing his demand for a reduction in size of the U.S. mission.192 On 
May 17, Diem and Nolting announced that the two governments had reaffirmed their 
commitment to the combined counterinsurgency effort.193 Though a break in the 
partnership had been avoided, by the spring of 1963, the U.S.-RVN relationship was at a 
low point, and the differences between Washington and Saigon concerning the U.S. role 
in South Vietnam remained unsettled.194 It is against this backdrop of deteriorating 
relations that the Buddhist Crisis occurred. 
B. THE BUDDHIST CRISIS 
The Buddhist Crisis began at a demonstration outside of a Hue radio station on 
May 8, 1963, but it was the result of growing tensions between Saigon and the Buddhist 
community of South Vietnam that began in the early days of the Diem regime. Not only 
concerned with preserving their religious freedoms, South Vietnamese Buddhists had 
their own conceptions of Vietnamese nationalism and the role that Buddhism could play 
in Vietnamese culture. They viewed the Diem regime’s nation-building campaign—
specifically, the land reform developments built with forced labor and designed to 
espouse self-reliance—as a thinly veiled attempt to impose Catholic values on the 
majority Buddhist population of South Vietnam.195 Diem had surprised his critics, 
however, by adopting a conciliatory stance toward the Buddhists as he formed his 
government, appointing several Buddhists to his cabinet and to senior positions within 
the ARVN corps of generals. He also authorized and funded a new place of Buddhist 
worship in Saigon, the Xa Loi pagoda.196 
Though Diem attempted to coopt the Buddhist community into the RVN with 
conciliatory policies, he was often undermined by the other Catholics within his 
government. The RVN bureaucracy consisted primarily of Catholics, many of whom 
treated their Buddhist compatriots with bigotry and prejudice. This treatment confirmed 
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the fears of many Buddhists that Saigon was intent on imposing Catholic values 
throughout the country.197 Chief among those undermining Diem’s efforts with the 
Buddhist community was his older brother, the Archbishop of Hue, Ngo Dinh Thuc. 
Upon his appointment to Archbishop, Thuc announced his intentions to transform the 
central region of South Vietnam into a bastion of Catholic faith, and he and his followers 
were soon accused by Buddhist leaders or forcing non-Catholics in the region to 
convert.198 It was at an anniversary celebration of Thuc’s promotion to bishop that the 
specific events leading to the May 8 demonstration began. 
Early in his administration, Diem attempted to promote the primacy of the state 
by ordering that, when flown, religious flags must be accompanied by a larger RVN flag, 
but both Buddhists and Catholics often ignored this provision.199 On May 6, Vietnamese 
Catholics in Hue and throughout the central region blatantly ignored the order, draping 
the cities in Catholic flags to celebrate the anniversary of Thuc’s promotion.200 The next 
day, in response to the brazen disregard for the flag law lead by his brother, Diem banned 
the use of religious flags of any faith denomination within South Vietnam. The ban 
coincided with the May 8 observance of Wesak Day, the annual celebration of Buddha 
that is often accompanied by the extensive use of religious flags. Regardless of his 
intention, Diem signaled a pro-Catholic inclination of the Saigon regime hours before one 
of the Buddhists’ most important religious celebrations. The ban added a spirit of 
antigovernment protest to the planned celebratory events, culminating in the 
demonstration at the Hue radio station.201 
On the evening of May 8, 1963, a large crowd of Buddhists assembled around the 
radio station in Hue to listen to a Wesak Day broadcast celebrating Buddha that was 
scheduled to begin at eight o’clock. The broadcast did not begin as scheduled, however, 
because the station manager refused to play the tape brought by the Buddhist leaders that 
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included antigovernment sentiments. The celebratory gathering quickly became an anti-
regime protest, and police and ARVN forces were dispatched to the station. Soon after 
the government security forces arrived and began attempting to control the crowd, a large 
explosion followed by a burst of gunshots caused chaos, and nine protestors were killed. 
The government forces blamed communist operatives, but numerous witnesses claimed 
that the government forces had initiated the violence. The killings at Hue triggered the 
beginning of a nation-wide Buddhist protest against the Diem regime.202 
Immediately following the demonstration at Hue, Buddhist leaders drafted the 
“Manifesto of the Vietnamese Buddhist Faithful,” a series of demands calling for equal 
treatment of Catholics and Buddhists within the RVN.203 Though he had come to suspect 
that the Viet Cong were responsible for the violence at Hue, Diem agreed to resolve the 
Buddhists’ complaints through dialogue, believing that negotiations would be the 
quickest way to ease tensions in South Vietnam and would simultaneously provide the 
government an opportunity to weaken the Buddhist resistance movement by focusing on 
the disagreements among its leaders. Over the next month, government officials met with 
a committee of Buddhist leaders to discuss their demands. On June 6, Diem and the 
Buddhist leadership declared that negotiations were nearly complete and that an equitable 
resolution should be expected soon.204 Despite Diem’s apparent commitment to 
negotiations, the settlement was quickly derailed by members of his own inner circle. 
Two days after Diem’s announcement, the Woman’s Solidarity Group—a pro-
government organization under the direction of Nhu’s wife, Madame Nhu—issued a 
resolution that characterized the Buddhist leadership as antigovernment agitators and 
criticized the government for being unduly compliant in the negotiations.205 The effect of 
the group’s resolution was amplified by Ngo Dinh Nhu, who ensured that it was widely 
distributed among the newspapers in Saigon.206 
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The resolution of the Woman’s Solidarity Group and Diem’s failure to condemn it 
convinced the Buddhist leadership that the government had no intention of honoring the 
negotiations. On June 10, the Buddhist leadership decided to pursue another track to 
achieving their demands, accepting an offer from the monk Thich Quang Duc to burn 
himself to death during an anti-regime demonstration in Saigon scheduled for the next 
morning. To maximize the effect of the monk’s sacrifice, the Buddhist leaders urged 
members of the foreign press to attend the demonstration. The next morning, Quang Duc 
silently burned to death in downtown Saigon among thousands of unsuspecting 
demonstrators, protected by monks who laid across the streets to prevent the arrival of 
fire trucks.207 The image of the self-immolation was captured by American journalist 
Malcom Browne, the only member of the foreign press who heeded the Buddhist 
leadership’s urging and attended the demonstration. Browne bypassed government 
censorship in Saigon by sending the film to Manila with Chester Bowles, a State 
Department official so committed to freedom of the press that he consented to 
transporting the film without demanding to know what the pictures would reveal.208 The 
publication of the photographs of Quang Duc’s death caused outrage in the United States 
and South Vietnam, and tensions were further raised by Madame Nhu’s public offer to 
provide the fuel for “bonze barbeques.”209 Though he expressed regret for Quang Duc’s 
death following the demonstration and reaffirmed his commitment to a negotiated 
resolution, Diem began to view the Buddhist movement as a communist-motivated threat 
to his regime.210 The Buddhist leadership had also lost any remaining faith in the 
government’s actual commitment to negotiations.211 
The heightened tensions in Saigon following Quang Duc’s self-immolation 
sparked debate within the Kennedy administration regarding a potential coup. During a 
series of meetings in early July, Diem’s supporters argued that he was justified in his 
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suspicion of the Buddhist movement due to the presence of “an activist element” among 
its ranks.212 Ambassador Nolting also argued that U.S. support of the Diem regime 
should continue because, despite the present crisis, the military campaign against the Viet 
Cong was proceeding well. Diem’s detractors at the State Department argued that the 
United States should be open to alternative leadership in Saigon, an opinion reinforced by 
a recently published NIE that asserted that the Diem regime’s continued failure to 
appease the Buddhists created a high probability for a coup.213 During the same period in 
Saigon, CIA operative Lucien Conein was approached by General Tran Van Don at the 
embassy’s annual Fourth of July celebration. Don, claiming to represent nearly all of the 
ARVN generals, informed Conein that a plan for a coup was in place and would likely 
occur within two weeks, and he requested to know if the United States was open to a 
coup.214 Don’s request further fueled the debate in Washington, and for weeks, the 
Kennedy administration remained undecided.215 
During the remaining weeks of July, civil unrest sparked by anti-regime protests 
continued to grow, and clashes between Buddhist protestors and government security 
forces became increasingly frequent. The Buddhist leadership began to fear that the Diem 
regime would move to violently quell the protests, appealing to an unreceptive Nolting to 
dispatch U.S. troops to protect Saigon’s pagodas.216 Nhu’s pro-regime newspaper, the 
Times of Viet Nam, fueled the environment of fear in Saigon, publishing rumors of 
government plans to attack the pagodas. Diem also added to the fear, publically declaring 
his suspicion that the Buddhist leadership had been coopted by the Viet Cong. Tensions 
continued to grow, and in early August, four additional monks publically burned 
themselves to death in anti-Diem protest.217 Concerned by the events and rumors, 
Nolting requested a meeting with Diem on August 12. Nolting left the meeting confident 
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in his support of Diem, having just heard from the president that he had no intention of 
inflicting violence on the Buddhist protestors.218 
On August 18, demonstrations erupted throughout South Vietnam, and a crowd of 
17,000 demonstrators amassed at Saigon’s Xa Lai pagoda for an anti-government protest. 
In addition to fomenting anti-regime sentiment, the Buddhist leaders promised to 
organize similarly massive protests to coincide with the arrival of the new U.S. 
ambassador to the RVN, Henry Cabot Lodge.219 Two days later, the Diem regime 
contradicted its promise to Nolting and launched a violent crackdown on the Buddhist 
movement at pagodas across South Vietnam. Diem declared martial law, and government 
security forces raided pagodas throughout the country. Though Diem blamed his decision 
to declare martial law on a supposed claim by ARVN generals that communist forces 
were massing near Saigon, the crackdown was carried out by ARVN Special Forces and 
police forces, both of which were outside the ARVN chain of command and reported 
directly to the regime.220 Though no Buddhists were killed, thousands were arrested and 
later tortured. Diem’s decision to renege on his promise to Nolting confirmed the fears of 
the Buddhists in South Vietnam and provided evidence to anti-Diem officials within the 
administration that it was time to push for a coup.221 
C. THE HILSMAN CABLE: DECISION FOR A COUP 
Following the August 1963 pagoda raids, the anti-Diem officials of the Kennedy 
administration orchestrated a change in U.S. policy, signaling to the ARVN conspirators 
in Saigon a favorable disposition toward a coup. One of the most ardent coup supporters 
within the administration was Roger Hilsman, a State Department official who had 
recently been promoted to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. 
Hilsman concluded that the pagoda raids were evidence that Diem and Nhu were 
pursuing policies that would result in the collapse of the entire U.S. strategy in Southeast 
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Asia. With the help of National Security Council (NSC) staffer Michael Forrestal, 
Hilsman drafted a memo to the newly appointed Ambassador Lodge on Saturday, August 
24. The memo instructed Lodge to demand that Diem remove Nhu from his government, 
and if he resisted, to indicate to the ARVN leadership that the United States favored a 
coup and was ready to recognize and aid a new government in Saigon. With Dean Rusk 
out of the city for the weekend, the senior State Department official in Washington was 
Assistant Secretary of State George Ball, an administration official who had consistently 
argued in favor of removing Diem. Hilsman brought the memo to Ball for review on the 
ninth hole of the Chevy Chase Country Club. Ball agreed with the memo’s contents, and 
he telephoned the president, who was also out of town for the weekend at his family 
home in Cape Cod. Kennedy told Ball that if Rusk and the leadership at the Department 
of Defense consented to the memo, then it had his approval.222 
The State Department transmitted Hilsman’s cable to Lodge on the evening of 
August 24. Lodge responded immediately, arguing that instead of approaching Diem and 
Nhu with demands that would hint at the pending coup, he should approach the ARVN 
generals and let them decide what to do with the Ngo brothers.223 Lodge then instructed 
Conein to meet with the ARVN’s top general, Tran Thien Khiem, and inform him that 
the United States now favored a coup and was prepared to recognize and aid a new 
government if the coup succeeded. Khiem informed the embassy that coup plans were in 
place and would likely be executed within a week.224 
A meeting at the White House the following Monday, August 26, revealed that 
the debate concerning Diem’s fate was far from resolved. It also revealed that Hilsman 
may have exploited his superiors’ absences over the weekend to effect a change in the 
U.S. policy for South Vietnam. Rusk, McNamara, and Taylor all expressed frustration at 
the unusual way the memo had been cleared through the president, and they each 
disagreed with the ultimatum to Diem and the absence of a specified length of time to 
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allow him to reform.225 Kennedy himself expressed frustration with the unusual manner 
in which the memo had been briefed, and he ended the meeting saying that the subject 
required further review.226 During the following week, administration officials met to 
debate the Hilsman memo. The argument mainly concerned whether or not Diem should 
be afforded more time to remove Nhu and reform his government. When Lodge 
discovered that the debate concerning a coup had restarted in Washington, he cabled to 
the State Department that it was too late, and that it was impossible to reverse course 
from a coup. The president ultimately decided not to alter the orders in Hilsman’s memo, 
and he directed the commander of MACV, General Paul D. Harkins, to confer with the 
ARVN generals over the coup details.227 
While U.S. officials were shifting policy in favor of regime change, Nhu had 
learned of the impending coup and maneuvered to unnerve the ARVN generals. Nhu 
summoned the generals to a meeting, where he shared a fabricated story that he had 
discovered a plot conceived by CIA operatives to overthrow the government, and that he 
had recently obtained assurances from Lodge that the embassy would address the 
problem and publically back the regime. Shortly after the meeting, they were further 
unsettled when General Ton That Dinh held a news conference to declare that he was 
behind the pagoda raids, and that the ARVN generals unanimously agreed that the raids 
were necessary to preserve the RVN’s internal security. Diem had recently appointed 
Dinh the military governor of Saigon, and his cooperation was crucial to the success of a 
coup. The combination of Dinh’s signal that he supported the Ngos, and Nhu’s attempt to 
frighten the generals, was enough to cause the coup leaders to postpone their plans. 
Khiem and General Le Van Kim met with Harkins on August 31 to inform the MACV 
commander that the coup plans remained in place, but that they would be postponed. 
During their conversation, the ARVN generals cited Nhu’s close relationship with the 
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CIA and Washington’s public support for the Diem regime as reasons to question the 
U.S. commitment to a coup.228 
D. INDECISION AND THE MCNAMARA–TAYLOR MISSION 
With coup plans indefinitely postponed while the ARVN generals awaited 
concrete commitment from the United States, the Kennedy administration returned to 
debating its South Vietnam policy. A series of White House meetings at the end of 
August exhibited the sharp division among administration officials over whether or not 
the United States should encourage Diem’s removal. Reports from Saigon indicated that 
Diem was continuing to lose support among Saigon’s elite, but Nolting countered by 
arguing that Diem enjoyed better support in the countryside and that his campaign against 
the Viet Cong was succeeding. Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson repeated the often-
cited argument that there did not appear to be a viable alternative to Diem in Saigon, and 
he agreed with Rusk’s contention that regardless of what happened in Saigon, the United 
States could not withdraw from South Vietnam until the communists were defeated. In 
addition to recognizing these issues, Kennedy became more concerned with the 
possibility of a coup attempt failing than whether or not Diem should be replaced. The 
president chose to defer a decision until a clearer picture of the situation was received 
from the embassy in Saigon.229 
The coups issue was readdressed at a September 6 meeting of the National 
Security Council. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy articulated the problem facing the 
administration: if a Viet Cong victory was inevitable, then the United States should 
completely withdraw from South Vietnam; if the Viet Cong could be defeated, but to do 
so would require Diem’s replacement, then the United States should clearly signal to the 
ARVN generals that it supported a coup. The meeting ended when those present felt they 
were unable to answer the attorney general’s questions, and another fact-finding mission 
was dispatched to Saigon. That evening, General Victor Krulak and State Department 
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official Joseph Mendenhall departed Washington bound for Saigon in an attempt to 
clarify the situation.230 
On September 10, Krulak and Mendenhall presented a report that further 
deepened the difference of opinion among the NSC officials. Krulak conveyed reports 
from MACV officials throughout the countryside who claimed that the campaign against 
the Viet Cong was proving successful, while Mendenhall reported that anti-regime 
sentiment in Saigon was continuing to increase. The debate remained relatively fixed 
between Defense Department officials who believed Diem should be retained and State 
Department officials who argued that unless Diem was replaced, the war would be lost. 
Lodge wrote from Saigon in support of the State Department’s argument, recommending 
that the United Stated end its aid program to the Diem regime.231 Senior officials met 
again on September 11 to discuss Lodge’s recommendation, but the meeting ended with 
no decision after Rusk recalled the relationship between the withdrawal of U.S. aid to 
Chinese nationalists and the subsequent communist victory.232 Six days later, 
administration officials met again to discuss Lodge’s recommendations. At the 
conclusion of the meeting, Kennedy decided that a cable should be sent to the embassy 
directing Lodge to pressure Diem to remove Nhu from his government, and that if he 
refused, to stop all U.S. aid to the RVN. Kennedy also ordered yet another fact-finding 
mission to Saigon to help clarify the situation, this time led by McNamara and Taylor.233 
Lodge quickly responded that he was being ordered to repeat a policy that had 
consistently failed, and that ending U.S. aid would have little impact on Diem and a 
large, negative impact on South Vietnam’s economy.234 
The situation McNamara and Taylor discovered in South Vietnam was decidedly 
more negative than they anticipated. CIA station chief John Richardson disclosed that 
Diem’s security forces regularly kidnapped and tortured regime opponents throughout 
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Saigon, and various military advisers reported that MACV’s assessment of the 
anticommunist campaign was inaccurate and not going well.235 Diem’s own vice 
president, Nguyen Ngoc Tho, concurred with the negative assessment of the military 
campaign and declared there to be “not more than 20 to 30 properly defended hamlets in 
the whole country.”236 
Despite these findings, the report they delivered to Kennedy upon their return to 
Washington asserted that MACV’s assessment was accurate and that the war against the 
communists was proving so successful that the United States should prepare to begin 
troop withdrawals before the end of the year. Though the report conceded that the 
political environment in Saigon was increasingly unstable, it also argued that there were 
no viable plans in place for a coup. The report recommended that while the United States 
should remain open to possible alternative leadership, the embassy should no longer 
conspire against Diem. The report also recommended that the Commercial Important 
Program (CIP), the principle facilitator of U.S. aid to the RVN, should be ended 
immediately to pressure Diem to reform.237 Kennedy concurred with the report, and the 
McNamara-Taylor mission recommendations were incorporated into National Security 
Action Memorandum (NSAM)-263. The State Department directed Lodge to cease 
conspiring against the Diem regime, but to also secretly work to identify viable 
alternatives.238 
E. THE COUP 
While the Kennedy administration was debating the details of NSAM-263, the 
ARVN generals approached the embassy to discuss the possibility of a coup, sharing the 
details of multiple scenarios with the CIA station that included the removal and 
assassination of Diem and Nhu.239 Lodge responded to the cable containing his new 
instructions from NSAM-263 with news of this development, urging the Kennedy 
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administration to offer clear U.S. support for a coup.240 Lodge was also motivated by 
recent indications that, contrary to MACV’s claims, the war in the countryside appeared 
to be turning in favor of the Viet Cong.241 
While he waited for a response from Washington, Lodge began implementing his 
new instructions. He immediately instituted restrictions on the CIP and ended the U.S. 
funding of the ARVN Special Forces, the regime-controlled wing of the military that had 
executed the pagoda raids. In an attempt to amplify the signal sent to the presidential 
palace by the aid cuts, Lodge ceased requesting audiences with Diem.242 Lodge had also 
maneuvered to create the conditions in Saigon that would signal a strong U.S. 
commitment to the ARVN generals’ coup plans. Following the generals complaints in 
August that Nhu enjoyed too close a relationship with the CIA station in Saigon, Lodge 
directed Richardson to stop meeting with the president’s brother. In early October, Lodge 
arranged Richardson’s departure from South Vietnam through an article in the 
Washington Daily News that identified him as the Saigon station chief, resulting in his 
recall to Langley. With Nhu’s CIA contact out of the country, Lodge believed he had 
signaled an earnest U.S. commitment to the ARVN generals.243 
On October 9, the White House responded to Lodge’s request in an “eyes only” 
cable informing him that while the United States did not want any direct role in a coup, 
the Kennedy administration would not prevent one and was prepared to aid and recognize 
a successor government.244 Lodge relayed this information to the ARVN generals, and on 
October 28, General Don notified the embassy that the coup, which would be entirely a 
Vietnamese operation, would occur within days. Lodge reported the news to the White 
House, declaring that absent informing the regime, the United States had no way of 
impacting Diem’s fate.245 
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On the morning of November 1, 1963, Lodge accompanied the visiting 
commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Admiral Harry Felt, to a meeting with Diem. 
During the meeting, Diem revealed no indications that he suspected the impending coup, 
and he even urged Lodge to inform Kennedy that he intended to reform his government 
in his own time while arguing against removing Nhu from the government.246 Later that 
day, ARVN troops entered the city, and the coup was under way. Diem requested the aid 
of U.S. troops from the embassy, but Lodge encouraged the president to surrender to the 
generals. In the early hours of November 2, Diem and Nhu escaped the presidential 
palace to Cholon, where they were seized and assassinated by ARVN troops later 
that day.247 
F. CONCLUSION 
During 1963, the Kennedy administration reversed its South Vietnam policy from 
support of the Diem government to an openness to Vietnamese-led regime change. 
Examination of U.S. foreign policy during the period reveals that the Kennedy 
administration’s evaluation of South Vietnam’s relative importance within U.S. 
containment policy and the primary threat facing the RVN were the same as they had 
been in the earlier days of 1961. Examination of the period also reveals that Diem 
continued to exhibit the exclusive, authoritarian style of governance that characterized his 
new government in 1954. The change in circumstances that compelled the shift in U.S. 
policy was, first, the perception among U.S. policymakers that Diem’s policies and 
actions were beginning to undermine the military campaign against the Viet Cong, and 
second, the simultaneous emergence of viable coup leadership in the ARVN generals. 
During 1963, the Kennedy administration’s evaluation of the primary threat to 
South Vietnam and South Vietnam’s importance to the application of containment policy 
to Southeast Asia remained unchanged. Through the final days of the Kennedy 
presidency, administration officials remained convinced that preventing a communist 
victory in South Vietnam was critical to preventing the loss of the entire region to the 
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communist bloc. They also understood South Vietnam as a national security problem that 
required a military solution. The primary threat to the RVN was the Viet Cong 
insurgency, and as long as the military campaign against the Viet Cong proceeded 
successfully, the Kennedy administration concluded that support of the Diem regime 
coincided with U.S. strategic interests. 
During the same period, Diem continued to exhibit the authoritarian leadership 
that consistently defined his government during his near decade in power. His violent 
repression of the Buddhist movement was the result of a similar policy formation process 
that produced his violent moves to consolidate power in the spring of 1955. Prior to May 
1963, U.S. foreign policy had been tolerant of Diem’s method of leadership, concluding 
that even though his policies conflicted with Western governance norms, his leadership 
proved effective enough to unite Saigon and facilitate a military campaign against the 
Viet Cong. Furthermore, an argument frequently presented at White House meetings 
during both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations was that discontent with 
Diem’s leadership was inconsequential—no viable alternative leadership existed in 
Saigon. 
After the Buddhist Crisis, the circumstances that informed Washington’s 
evaluation of Diem changed in two major ways. First, the violent repression of Buddhists 
and the resulting deterioration of domestic and international support for the Diem regime 
revealed that Diem’s policies were undermining the military campaign against the Viet 
Cong, an assessment reinforced by later revelations that the military successes touted by 
Saigon and MACV were inaccurate. Second, the coalition of ARVN generals who 
planned and executed the coup represented a potential alternative leadership in Saigon 
around whom the United States could center its containment policy. Though the coup was 
entirely a Vietnamese operation, and the United States would have had to deal with the 
fallout whatever the outcome, the Kennedy’s greenlight to the generals was a clear 
indication of the administration’s assessment that the Diem experiment had failed, and 
that the positive impact his removal would have on U.S. strategic interests was worth the 
risk of a failed coup or failed governance of the RVN by the ARVN generals. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The strategic value of South Vietnam to U.S. national security interests was the 
same to the Eisenhower administration in the days leading to the Geneva Conference of 
1954 as it was to the Kennedy administration in late 1963. Both presidents articulated the 
importance of South Vietnam to U.S. interests in similar terms, asserting that the 
reunification of Vietnam under the leadership of Hanoi would lead to the loss of the 
entire Southeast Asian region to communism. This policy accepted the premise that the 
DRV was executing a small part of a global assault on the Western world that was led by 
Moscow and Beijing, a belief among U.S. officials that was enflamed in early 1961 when 
Khrushchev declared that the Soviet Union would support wars of national liberation. 
This policy also implied that abandoning the partnership with Saigon was not an option 
for either administration. During the 1950s and 1960s, the containment of communism 
was the principle U.S. foreign policy concern, and hardline anticommunism was the 
zeitgeist of American politics. For either president to risk facilitating a communist victory 
by completely withdrawing support from South Vietnam would likely have earned them 
the label of a communist appeaser and made reelection a near impossibility. Within this 
environment, both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations enacted programs of 
U.S. support and advice for South Vietnam, never considering complete withdrawal as an 
option. Up until mid-1963, both administrations concluded that implementation of these 
programs required a direct partnership with the Diem regime. 
Another factor that remained consistent from 1954-1963 was Diem’s style of 
governance. From the early days of his partnership with the United States, Diem showed 
that he would disregard U.S. advice if it did not coincide with his assessment of the best 
course of action. Diem often resisted U.S. guidance, including those times when he was 
counseled by J. Lawton Collins regarding the formation of his government, by Donald R. 
Heath concerning his handling of the sects in Saigon, by Frederick Reinhardt concerning 
the Bao Dai referendum, by Elbridge Durbrow with respect to Diem’s nation building 
program, and by Frederick Nolting regarding the Buddhist Crisis. Each ambassador, 
along with countless U.S. officials, urged governmental reforms designed to broaden the 
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base of domestic support for Diem’s regime, a problem about which Americans always 
seem to have felt well-versed. At every stage of the U.S.-Diem partnership, up to and 
including his final day in power, Diem chose to pursue his own vision for Vietnam, 
building a government in Saigon that was autocratic, exclusive, and reflective of his 
Catholic chauvinism. Pursuit of this vision did not allow for opposition to his 
government, which was often dealt with violently. 
The final factor among those that remained consistent through both the 
Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations was the debate concerning the primary threat to 
South Vietnam’s survival. This debate generally divided each administration into two 
opposing camps. One camp consisted largely (though not exclusively) of State 
Department officials who asserted that Diem and his policies were the primary threat to 
South Vietnam. They argued that Diem’s refusal to broaden his government by opening 
his cabinet to opposition members and holding truly fair elections lost him the support of 
Saigon’s political elite both within and outside the government. They argued that Diem’s 
various land reform projects, which were ineffective, costly, and reliant upon the forced 
labor of South Vietnam’s rural population, had lost him any chance of support among the 
rural population while simultaneously providing a base of support for the Viet Cong. 
Finally, they argued that Diem’s apparent favoritism toward Catholics had lost him the 
support of the majority Buddhist population. This anti-Diem camp concluded that absent 
Diem’s removal, the entire U.S. containment strategy for Southeast Asia was doomed 
to fail. 
The second camp—whose argument both administrations ultimately embraced as 
policy—asserted that the primary threat to South Vietnam was the military of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Hanoi-directed insurgency. To this 
camp, which consisted largely of Defense Department officials, South Vietnam faced a 
national security problem that called for a military solution. Saigon needed to increase its 
capacity to counter the threat of invasion from the North while establishing internal 
security. According to this argument, concern with Diem’s style of governance was 
superfluous and distracted the administration from the problem at hand. Eisenhower 
administration officials even argued that Diem’s authoritarianism was culturally 
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appropriate, and both administrations agreed that despite Diem’s shortcomings, he 
possessed the traits required to keep Saigon united and capable of executing a successful 
counterinsurgency campaign. Most importantly, he was staunchly anticommunist, and 
there were no viable leadership alternatives in Saigon. Both administrations’ aid 
programs reflected this argument, vastly expanding the Army of the Republic of Vietnam 
(ARVN) and supporting Diem’s efforts to achieve internal security. 
Two developments in mid-1963 changed the Kennedy administration’s 
assessment of the situation in South Vietnam and ultimately resulted in U.S. support for a 
coup. The first development was the emergence of alternative leadership in Saigon in the 
form of the ARVN generals. The generals’ approaches to the embassy always took the 
form of notification, rather than consultation. They would inform U.S. officials that a 
Vietnamese plan to replace Diem was in place and ask what position the United States 
would take toward an alternative government in Saigon. Thus the United States was 
never put in a position of conspiring directly against its own client. At the same time, 
however, it took no steps to prevent such plans from being made in the first place. Diem 
was of course broadly aware of dissatisfaction within the officer corps, and he did not 
need the United States to inform him of it. 
The second development was the increasing belief among Kennedy 
administration officials that Diem’s leadership, culminating with his handling of the 
Buddhist Crisis, was undermining the U.S.-Republic of Vietnam (RVN) 
counterinsurgency campaign. Following the violent crackdown on the Buddhists in 
August 1963, Diem appeared less and less capable of uniting the fractious political 
environment of Saigon. Combined, these two developments resulted in the Kennedy 
administration’s assessment that a coup would create conditions more favorable to the 
achievement of U.S. security interests in Southeast Asia than a continued partnership 
with the Diem regime. 
The Kennedy administration’s decision to end the Diem experiment did not, 
however, coincide with a reevaluation of the major problem facing South Vietnam and 
the source of that problem. The Americans ultimately gave the greenlight to the generals 
because they had concluded that the Diem regime was undermining the 
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counterinsurgency operation. The military threat of the insurgency was still the primary 
problem, and Diem’s inability to unite his country was distracting the partnership from 
addressing that problem. There was no discussion about the possibility that nearly 10 
years of ineffective Diem regime policies had resulted in the alienation of the rural 
population from the central government, creating a base of support throughout the 
countryside for the communist insurgency. There was no discussion concerning the 
relationship between Diem’s harsh treatment of opposition leaders and the 
marginalization of Saigon’s political and military elite. Finally, there was no discussion 
regarding how the military focus of the U.S. aid program to South Vietnam ignored the 
political inequities at the root of Diem’s problems while simultaneously establishing the 
military capability employed to depose him. 
The failure of the Diem experiment shows that military security cannot act as a 
substitute for the political stability achieved by legitimate government. When choosing to 
approach the situation in South Vietnam as a military problem, both Eisenhower and 
Kennedy concluded that the political problems in Saigon would resolve themselves once 
the military had established a secure environment. The numerous failed policies of the 
Diem regime were judged to have alienated the majority of the country, creating the 
conditions that rendered the achievement of such a secure environment impossible. By 
sustaining the Diem regime with military aid, the United States facilitated the further 
division of South Vietnamese society until the U.S.–RVN partnership was no longer 
viable with Diem in power. 
The failure of the Diem experiment also shows that limited-liability partnerships, 
once they begin to fail, may pose significantly more political risk than initially 
appreciated. The U.S.–RVN partnership conceived by the Eisenhower administration and 
continued by the Kennedy administration was designed to achieve U.S. security 
objectives at minimal risk and cost to the United States. Diem, however, proved not to be 
the nationalist, anticommunist leader that Eisenhower and Kennedy had hoped would 
unite South Vietnam. By the time the Kennedy administration concluded that support of 
Diem no longer served U.S. strategic interests, the United States had facilitated the 
survival of his regime for nine years. Each of those years included public affirmations of 
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the U.S. commitment to South Vietnam’s survival that coincided with the growing 
commitment of U.S. manpower and treasure, greatly increasing the political risk 
associated with the partnership. The U.S.–RVN partnership that hinged on Diem’s 
success resulted in a war that lasted for 30 years, involved the direct engagement of U.S. 
troops, and cost the United States hundreds of billions of dollars. Most significantly, the 
entire partnership proved an ineffective policy, ultimately failing to prevent the 
reunification of Vietnam under a communist regime. 
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